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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAUL GARDNER, PAUL GARDNER ) 
dba NUF CORPORATION and ) 
NUF CORPORATION, a Utah ) 
Corporation, ) 
J 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
) 
KENNETH MADSEN, MARILYN MADSEN, ) Case No. 960683-CA 
and NAUTI LADY L.C., ) 
A Limited Partnership, ) Argument Priority 15 
) 
Defendants/Appellants. ) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County which awarded monetary damages 
and quieted title to a houseboat located at Hite Marina, Lake 
Powell, Utah. There have been no prior appeals. 
Jurisdiction is based upon assignment from the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(j), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
WITH CITATION TO RECORD FOR PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to find that 
Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants are barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata? (R 120-121; R 277 P 3-4) 
2. Did the trial court err in finding that contrary 
to the clear and unambiguous language of the written contract, 
Plaintiff Paul Gardner rather than NUF, Inc. had a contractual 
claim against Defendants Madsen? (R 277 P 3) 
3. Did the trial court err in failing to apply the 
proper law to the undisputed facts that the corporate Plaintiff 
had been dissolved prior to entry into the contract and that the 
contract or any attempt to assign rights under that contract was 
therefore void? (R 277, P 2) 
4. Did the trial err in assessing damages based upon 
the full value of 3 0% of the total prime usage weeks when 
Plaintiffs had purchased only 10% ownership in the entity, failed 
to account for the value of non-peak weeks which had been 
effectively converted to peak "summer" weeks, and in determining 
that the subsequently formed Limited Liability Company was 
responsible for any damages to Plaintiff? 
(R 896-898) 
5. Did the trial court err in failing to disclose 
that his nephew was a principal in the Plaintiff corporation and 
a business partner of Plaintiff Paul Gardner, in failing to 
recuse himself and in failing to grant a new trial before an 
2 
impartial judge? (R 905, P 21) 
6. Should Defendants be awarded their costs and 
attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the action at trial 
and on this appeal? (R 277, P 16-17) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following standards of review apply to the issues for 
review set forth herein: 
a. The standard of review for the trial court's 
findings of fact is the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
Alta Indus. LTD vs. Hurst. 846 P.2nd 1282, 186 (Utah 1993). 
b. The broadest scope of judicial review extends 
to questions of law in order to insure that the law is applied 
equally throughout the jurisdiction. State v. Pena, 869 P.2nd 936 
(Utah 1994). 
c. Whether the trial court abused its discretion 
in failing to disclose a close family relationship to a principal 
in the case and by denying Defendants' Motion for a New Trial on 
the basis of a judicial conflict of interest is reviewed by 
whether the conduct was beyond the limits of reasonableness. 
State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 334 (Utah 1993). 
d. The standard of review on the award of 
attorney's fees at trial is abuse of discretion. Baldwin v. 
Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1198 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Sections 16-10-51, 16-10-88.2 and 16-10-100 of the Code 
Annotated (Utah Business Corporation Act as effective 1990). 
3 
See Appendix A of Addendum. 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct: Terminology - (1) "Economic 
interest"; (2) "Third degree of relationship"; and Canon 1; Canon 
2 A and B; and Canon 3 E(l)(c)(d)(i-iv) and F. 
See Appendix B of Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
a. Breach of Contract: Where the purported 
contract was entered into by a dissolved corporation and where a 
principal of that dissolved corporation is attempting to enforce 
the terms of that contract personally and on behalf of the 
dissolved corporation. 
b. Judicial Conduct: Where the trier of fact 
failed to disclose a family relationship with a principal of and 
business partner to Plaintiffs in the action. 
c. Res Judicata: Where a previous court had 
granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs for the same 
complaint filed by the same principals with virtually the exact 
wording of the case subsequently litigated. 
d. Damages: Where the damages awarded to 
Plaintiffs for breach of contract failed to account for the value 
of what was undisputedly available to Plaintiffs. 
2. Course of Proceedings. 
a. First case: Plaintiff NUF, Inc. filed suit 
against Defendants Madsen claiming breach of contract. Judge 
Frederick granted Defendants' Summary Judgment that there was no 
4 
cause of action as a result of the corporation's dissolution by 
the State. 
b. Second case: Plaintiffs' filed the instant 
case adding Paul Gardner as named Plaintiff and with NUF, Inc. as 
a "D.B.A.". Judge Wilkinson denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
for res judicata and their Motion for Summary Judgment, in which 
they alleged that the contract had been entered into by a 
corporation which had been dissolved, was therefore void, and 
which gave Plaintiffs' no standing before the court. Both 
rulings were without comment nor findings. 
c. Post-trial: Defendants filed a Motion for a 
New Trial and Reassignment of Judge on the basis of the 
subsequently discovered family relationship between the trial 
judge and a party in interest in the case. That motion was 
denied by Judge Wilkinson and subsequently denied by presiding 
Judge Lewis. 
3. Disposition in the Trial Court. A two day bench 
trial in which the court found that, contrary to the clear and 
unambiguous language of the contract, the contract was entered 
into by Plaintiff Paul Gardner and that all Defendants, including 
the subsequently formed Limited Liability Company were liable to 
Mr. Gardner for damages. The Court awarded compensatory damages 
and attorney's fees to Plaintiffs of approximately $78,000.00 and 
quieted title to 10% of the boat in Plaintiff Gardner personally. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
Plaintiff NUF, Inc. was incorporated in Utah on April 28, 
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1988, dissolved by the Corporations Division on May 1, 1990 and 
never reinstated. (Hereinafter this corporation shall be "NUF 
1".) (R 161) 
On June 15, 1990, less than 2 months after its dissolution, 
Plaintiff NUF 1, through Paul Gardner as President, purportedly 
entered into a contract with Defendants Kenneth and Marilyn 
Madsen (hereinafter "Mr. Madsen" and "Mrs. Madsen") for the 
purchase of a 10% interest in a houseboat known as "Nauti Lady" 
(hereinafter "houseboat" in order to differentiate from the 
Limited Liability Company of same name.) (P. Exh. 11) None of 
the parties to the contract was aware that NUF 1 had been 
dissolved. (Tl at 3 8 and Tl at 60) The undisputed consideration 
for this purchase was $10,000.00. (Tl at 196) Defendants claimed 
that the consideration also included the payment of a 
disproportionate share of the maintenance and upkeep expenses. 
(Tl at 239-240) Plaintiff characterized these payments as 
justification for being entitled to 3 times the proportionate 
amount of the prime (summer) usage weeks. (Tl at 42, 15-18) 
Defendants denied an "entitlement" to the extra summer weeks but 
did acknowledge that they had agreed to allow extra summer use on 
a space available basis. (Tl at 198) 
There had been discussions between Madsens and Paul Gardner 
as President of NUF 1 before June 15, 1990, but only sparse 
evidence as to whether these discussions took place on, before or 
after May 1, 1990. (Tl at 125, 236 and 196, L4) 
The evidence presented by Plaintiffs on nearly every 
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material issue of the case was diametrically opposed by 
Defendants and their evidence. The evidence on those issues were 
as follows: 
a. Content of Contract: 
(1) Plaintiffs introduced Exhibit No. 11 as their 
version of the contract. The only person privy to the contract 
on behalf of Plaintiffs was Paul Gardner who testified that there 
had been no alteration to the face or body of the contract since 
it had been executed. (Tl at 41, 2-5) 
(2) Mr. Madsen testified that at the time that 
the contract was executed, he initialled minor changes to the 
contract, but those changes did not include the word "summer". 
(Tl at 195, 1-16) Mr. Madsen's copy of the contract, Defendants' 
Exhibit #2 did not contain the interlineation with the word 
"summer", but did contain the same initials for Mr. Madsen that 
appeared on Plaintiff's copy. (T2 at 41, 1-17) Mr. Madsen 
emphatically denied that the word "summer" was ever written into 
the contract in his presence or with his approval. (T2 at 44, 14-
25) Finally, Mr. Madsen testified that in his business 
experience it was always his practice to initial all copies of 
the contract when changes had been made. (T2 at 45, 2-13) 
(3) Defendant's expert witness, George 
Throckmorton, testified that Plaintiff's Exhibit 11 had been 
altered after changes made to the contract had been photocopied. 
(T2 at 38, 8-11) The original changes were written by the same 
pen and hand that had written the initials KM [Defendant Kenneth 
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Madsen] (T2 at 38, 13-23) He further stated that there was ..."a 
third pen that was used that wrote in the word "summer" and the 
slashing line that pointed between the words "weeks" and "each". 
(T2:38:24) He also noted that the third pen had not been used 
elsewhere in the document. (T2 at 39, 2-5) 
(4) In his ruling, Judge Wilkinson found that 6 
summer weeks, equivalent to 3 0% of the peak usage time was a 
reasonable interpretation of the contract in consideration for 
Plaintiffs' purchase of a 10% ownership. (R 277 at 5, 25)1 
b. Parties to Contract: 
(1) On their case in chief Plaintiffs provided no 
evidence that the contract was entered into by any person or 
entity other than NUF 1. On cross-examination Mr. Gardner 
admitted that he had filled in the blank with the buyers 
information and that no one else had told him to write in "NUF, 
Inc." (Tl at 112-113) When specifically asked about his 
intention at the time that he executed the contract, he stated 
that it was his intention to enter into the contract on behalf of 
"NUF, Inc.". (Tl at 113, 10-13) However, in his redirect 
testimony Paul Gardner raised for the first time the claim that 
he had personally purchased 10% of the houseboat. (Tl at 12 9, 12-
13) Gardner did admit that he had stricken the original words 
xAfter 2 requests the appellate clerks at the Third District 
could not locate the original transcript of the judge's bench 
ruling. A copy of the first page of that ruling is included at 
page 277 of the record. As a convenience to the Court, Appellants 
have attached a copy of the entire ruling as appendix C to their 
brief. Page numbers correlate to those in that attachment. 
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"husband and wife" when he inserted the words "NUF, Inc" as 
buyer. (Tl at 112, 12-32) 
(2) Mr. Madsen testified that the contract was 
drafted with NUF, Inc. (NUF 1) as the Buyer. (Tl at 236, 16) Mr. 
Madsen further testified that Mr. Gardner had told him that the 
ownership of the houseboat was to be placed in the name of the 
corporation to protect it from Mr. Gardner's wife, with whom he 
was experiencing some marital difficulties. (Tl at 236, 18-20) 
He emphatically denied that the contract had been made with Paul 
Gardner personally. (Tl at 236, 21-23) 
(3) The wording of the contract itself is very 
clear and unambiguous. The parties to the contract are clearly 
Mr. and Mrs. Madsen and "NUF, Inc. a Utah Corporation". 
(P. Exh. 1, Page 1) In addition, it is clear from even the 
photocopy of the contract presented by Plaintiffs that Paul 
Gardner signed on behalf of the buyer as "NUF, Inc. by Paul 
Gardner, its president". (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, Page 4) 
(4) Judge Wilkinson ruled that the contract was 
actually between Mr. Gardner personally and Madsens. 
c. Limited Liability Company: 
(1) Plaintiffs provided no evidence regarding any 
contractual rights between them and Defendant Nauti Lady L.L.C. 
(2) Defendants' evidence showed that, subsequent 
to the contract between them and NUF 1, they had sold shares to 2 
other parties, subsequent to which a Limited Liability Company 
was formed for the purpose of managing the houseboat. (T2 at 6-7) 
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(3) The letter submitted by Plaintiffs as Exhibit 
No. 45 which Plaintiff Gardner claimed to be an infringement of 
his rights by the L.L.C. clearly states that it is written on 
behalf of Madsens as the party with whom Plaintiffs had their 
contract. (P. Exh. 45) The correspondence also reflects that 
Plaintiffs use of the boat was not suspended until after 
Plaintiffs filed the litigation. (Exh. 23, Tl at 81-82)2 In his 
cross-examination, Mr. Gardner admitted that no one had taken any 
action to suspend his ongoing usage of the boat until after he 
filed suit against Madsens. (Tl at 40) 
(4) In its ruling, the court found that the 
Limited Liability Company was jointly and severally liable for 
the damages to Plaintiffs for the loss of use after formation of 
the company. (R 8 96-898) 
d. Damages: 
(1) Mr. Gardner testified that he had only used 
the boat 9 times since entry into the contract. (Tl at 63, 18-19) 
Even with this testimony the court found that he had used the 
boat 6 times. (R 277 at P 15) Although he made vague claims to 
having been denied use of weeks, (Tl at 64-65) he provided no 
evidence as to the weeks that had been requested and denied, 
other than the week for which his use had been forfeited as a 
result of the violation of the houseboat rules. (Tl at 63, 22-24) 
2Mr. Gardner then states that he contacted Mr. Summerhays 
after receiving the letter. However, the letter was dated July 27, 
1993. Mr. Summerhays filed the first complaint against Madsens on 
July 8, 1993. (See Civil # 930903925) 
10 
(2) Mr. Madsen testified on the basis of rental 
inquiries which he had made, flyers published by the Lake Powell 
concessionaire and his own knowledge of the comparison of 
houseboats available for rent on the lake that the average rental 
value during the peak summer months was $1,800.00. When he 
attempted to testify as to the value of off-peak weeks, that 
testimony was excluded by the trial judge. (Tl and 231) However, 
Defendants' Exhibit 3, which was admitted shows the going rates 
for off-season rentals for a 50 foot boat to be $1,199. (D. Exh. 
3) He also testified that the agreement had been for Plaintiffs 
to utilize the boat on a space available basis, and that the 
requests made by Plaintiff had been met except when the boat was 
down for repairs and the week that was forfeited as a result of 
Gardner's repeated rule violations. (Tl at 198 and Tl at 201) 
(3) In making its ruling, the court ignored the 
reality that it had, in fact, converted Plaintiff's off season 
weeks into prime weeks. In doing so, the court assessed the 
damages on the basis of $1,800.00 per week, totally ignoring the 
value of the off season weeks to which Plaintiff had been 
otherwise entitled under the contract. (Ruling P 15 Ll-3) The 
court also based those damages on the assumption that Gardner had 
been denied each week that he did not use the boat. (Ruling P 15 
at 15-18) It made no finding as to the number of weeks that had 
been requested and denied, nor the availability of the boat 
during the off-season. 
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e. Maintenance Assessment: 
(1) Mr. Gardner testified for Plaintiffs that he 
had agreed to pay 2 0% of the maintenance expenses because "I'd be 
using the boat more than him [Mr. Madsen]" (Tl at 42, 14-18) 
(2) Mr. Madsen testified that the document had 
been originally drafted with a 25% allocation of maintenance 
expenses to each buyer, but that it had been changed to 2 0% at 
the request of Mr. Gardner since there would be ultimately 5 
users of the boat in the long run, and 2 0% would reflect an equal 
allocation between the 5. (Tl at 239) Mr. Madsen testified that 
the 25% was based upon the fact that the minority shareholders 
would split the maintenance costs since they had contributed less 
toward the purchase price (Tl at 240) 
f. Operator Damage: 
(1) Mr. Gardner testified that he "voluntarily 
agreed to pay" for the repair of the outdrives on the boat. (Tl 
at 45, 11-13) This was supposedly done as a gesture of "good 
faith" so that the boat would be functional for the following 
summer. (Tl at 45, 13-15) At trial Mr. Gardner claimed that 
these payments were "advances" on his 2 0% obligation for any 
maintenance fee obligations. (Tl at 38, 14-25) He claimed that 
major damage to the boat was to be paid from the maintenance fee 
into which all owners would contribute in proportion to their 
ownership. (Tl at 45, 16-2 0 and Tl at 146, 5-8) 
(2) Mr. Madsen testified that the maintenance fee 
was to cover routine maintenance and not damage caused to the 
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boat by operator negligence. (Tl at 209, 23-25 and Tl at 210, 8-
25) He stated that Mr. Gardner had caused the damage to the 
outdrives, and that at the time Gardner agreed to make the 
payment for those repairs since he had been at fault and felt 
obligated to do so under the contract. (T2 at 50, 4-19, T2 at 52, 
4-25 and T2 at 55, 1-10) 
(3) The relevant paragraph of the contract is No. 
4, which as modified by the parties reads: 
BUYERS further agree to reimburse SELLERS for 
twenty-five (25%) (20%) [parties' initials] 
percent of any out of pocket expenses 
reasonably incurred to keep the property and 
equipment thereon in good working order or to 
repair any damages or equipment failures NOT 
INCURRED BY ANY ONE PARTY. (Refer to Boat 
Rules and Regulation). 
The last six words of the sentence are clear, appear in all 
capital letters in the contract, and are followed by a reference 
to the Rules and Regulations for the boat. 
g. Propeller repair: 
(1) Mr. Gardner admitted that he repaired the 
propeller on at least one occasion but claims that he did not 
damage it. (Tl at 55-57) 
(2) Mr. Madsen testified that several damaged 
props were discovered upon arrival at the lake during the weeks 
after Mr. Gardner had used the boat. (Tl at 210-212) Neither Mr. 
Madsen nor Mrs. Madsen could testify that they saw Mr. Gardner 
cause the damage, but both did testify that when the boat was 
last in their control it was in good repair but that after 
Gardner's use it had been damaged. (Tl at 201 and T2 at 23) 
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(3) The court made no ruling as to the damaged 
propellers but lumped these items into the normal maintenance 
category. (Ruling at 11-12) 
In addition to five pages of the basic contract, the 
document included 4 attachments (the Rules and Regulations, 
checklists to be executed upon the commencement and termination 
of each usage, an inventory of the items included on the 
houseboat and miscellaneous cleaning instructions)• (T2 at 17, 
15-23) Mr. Gardner testified that he faithfully utilized the 
checklists when he arrived at the houseboat and when he left it. 
(Tl at 84, 7-21 and T2 at 88, 7-12) However, on cross-
examination Mr. Gardner did not know the difference between the 
oil breather vent and the access for the oil dipstick on the main 
engines. (T2 at 81-82) In fact, he testified that it was 
impossible to check the oil in the engines because there was no 
dipstick in the breather vent. (T2 at 74) 
Similarly, the court found Plaintiffs to be responsible for 
the damage to the refrigerator, the proper procedures for which 
were included in the checklist. (R at 12, 15-17) 
In 1991 Madsens sold a second 10% share of the houseboat to 
a third party with a contract virtually identical for that used 
with Plaintiff NUF 1. The changes to that contract were 
consistent with those admittedly made by Kenneth Madsen in the 
contract with NUF 1. (Tl at 198, 19-25) The changes to this 
contract were confirmed by the buyer, Duane Shaw, both as to 
timing and extent and all changes were initialled by the parties. 
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(T2 at 12, 4-19) 
In early June 1993 Defendants Madsen discovered conclusive 
evidence that Gardner had violated the rule regarding pets on the 
houseboat, in that Gardner had kept a dog on the boat during the 
first week in June 1993. (T2 at 58, 17-18) Gardner ultimately 
admitted having the dog on the boat, but denied knowing that it 
was an infraction of the rules. The Court did find that he had 
received those rules. (Ruling at 7, 5-22) The unrebutted 
testimony was that the infraction was considered serious because 
several of the users had experienced allergy problems from pet 
dander. 
After discovering the evidence of the pet violation, 
Defendants Madsen notified Gardner that his disregard for the 
rules was intolerable and that he would forfeit his next week 
usage as a result of the most recent violation. (T2 at 58, 1-25 
and P. Exh. 45) This is the only week that all parties agreed 
had been requested by Gardner and subsequently denied. 
The NUF/Madsen contract did not specify any procedures for 
due process regarding violations. The contract did, however, 
provide for forfeiture due for rule violations. (Exh D-2, Rules 
8, 10 and 13) There was no evidence at trial that anyone other 
than Plaintiffs (i.e. 10% of the ownership) objected to the 
sanctions imposed for the repeated violations by Gardner. 
Gardner filed the first action against Defendants Madsen on 
or about July 8, 1993. That action was assigned Civil No. 
93 0903 925 and assigned to J. Dennis Frederick of the Third 
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District Court, Salt Lake County. (R at 120) 
On August 26, 1993, Judge Frederick, granted summary 
judgment against Plaintiff NUF, Inc. on the grounds that NUF, 
Inc. had been dissolved by statute and was not a legal entity 
entitled to pursue the action. No appeal of this decision was 
ever filed by NUF 1. (R at 121, 141 and 146) 
On August 12, 1993, Gardner caused to be filed with the 
Corporations Division a new entity known as NUF, Inc. 
(hereinafter referred to as "NUF 2"). (R 122 at para. 11) On or 
about October 19, 1993, through the same attorney Gardner and NUF 
2 filed the present suit against Defendants Madsen but also named 
the Limited Liability Company as a Defendant. (R 121 at para. 15) 
There was no evidence that Gardner was not the real party in 
interest in both suits nor that the Limited Liability Company had 
done anything contrary to Plaintiffs' interests after the 
judgment was entered in the first case. This action was 
improperly filed in the Circuit Court but was ultimately 
transferred and assigned Civil No. 93 0906772, before Judge Homer 
J. Wilkinson, (hereinafter Instant Case.) (R 121 at para. 16) 
With the exception of the heading, which included Paul 
Gardner personally as a Plaintiff, Nauti Lady, L.L.C. as a newly 
named Defendant and a new Count No. VI which related to a 
purported cause of action against the L.L.C. that transpired 
before August 26, 1993, the Complaint in case 2 was exactly the 
same as that which had been dismissed by Judge Frederick in Case 
No. 1. The purported cause of action arose from the same 
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contract, with all of the same signatures and changes. Even the 
grammatical and spelling errors were identical. (R at 121, para. 
5 and R at 122-123) 
On or about July 27, 1993, Defendants filed a Motion to 
Dismiss the second case on the grounds of res judicata. (R 13-14) 
Plaintiffs responded that NUF, Inc. was [now] a corporation in 
good standing and capable of filing and pursuing the action.3 (R 
31 at para. 1) Defendants' motion was denied without findings or 
comment by Judge Wilkinson on May 3, 1994. (R 66) 
Defendants subsequently made a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the same grounds set forth in the first case before Judge 
Fredericks, i.e. that NUF 1 was the only entity that had been a 
party to the Madsen contract, and that any rights which NUF 1 
might have had were terminated by the corporate dissolution. 
(R120) Defendants specifically alleged that NUF 2 was a totally 
separate legal entity, had no interest in the June 15, 1990 
contract, and had no cause of action against these Defendants. (R 
12 0-121) The court declined to rule on the motion even after the 
presentation of the Plaintiff's case at trial. (Tl at 190, 6-25 
and R at 277, P3 L25 - P4 L2) 
At trial Defendants learned that Clayton H. Wilkinson was an 
3The significance of NUF 2 was made clear by Plaintiffs in 
their response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss which was filed in 
the Circuit Court prior to the transfer of the case to District 
Court. Paragraph 1 from their statement of facts reads as follows: 
"The Plaintiff NUF, Inc. is a Utah Corporation filed and 
incorporated on August 12, 1993, for the purpose of 
continuing the business operation of NUF, Inc. a prior 
Utah corporation." (R. 31 at para. 1) 
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incorporator and director of Plaintiff NUF, Inc., a close 
personal friend and a business partner of Plaintiff Paul Gardner. 
(Tl at 124, 2-4), (Tl at 181-188) and (T2 at 79, L22 as Exh 53) 
Unknown to Defendants Mr. Wilkinson is a nephew of the judge who 
presided over the bench trial in this matter. (R 346 para. 4) 
Although his name and his close personal ties to the case were 
mentioned on at least 3 separate occasions during trial, Judge 
Wilkinson made no comment nor disclosure regarding his family 
relationship to Clayton Wilkinson. Defendants learned of the 
relationship well after the completion of the trial when 
Defendant Kenneth Madsen received an anonymous telephone call on 
the subject. (R 345-346) He then hired a genealogist to check 
whether the anonymous caller had been correct. (R 348-35 0) Upon 
receipt of the confirmation he filed a Motion for New Trial and 
Reassignment of Judge. (R 343) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
Prior to the filing of their complaint in this matter, Judge 
Frederick had granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs on a 
complaint that was virtually identical to the complaint filed in 
this action. The complaint was filed by the same attorney, had 
all of the same parties in interest and arose from the same 
contract between Plaintiffs and Defendants Madsen. Although 
Plaintiffs added Paul Gardner personally as a Plaintiff, there is 
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no question but that Mr. Gardner was privy to, and was in fact 
the real party in interest on behalf of Plaintiffs in the first 
case. Similarly, although Plaintiffs named Nauti Lady, L.L.C. as 
a party defendant in the second case, the L.L.C. was formed 
subsequent to the contract in question and any actions by the 
L.L.C. preceded the summary judgment against Plaintiffs in the 
first case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONTRARY TO THE 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT, 
PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER RATHER THAN NUF, INC. HAD A 
CONTRACTUAL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS MADSEN 
Contrary to the clear and unambiguous wording of the 
contract between the parties, the trial judge went beyond the 
four corners of that document to reach a determination that 
Plaintiff Paul Gardner personally was a party to the contract 
with standing to bring this action against Defendants. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROPER 
LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT THE CORPORATE 
PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN DISSOLVED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE 
CONTRACT AND THAT THE CONTRACT OR ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIGN 
RIGHTS UNDER THAT CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE VOID 
Contrary to the finding by the trial court the dissolved 
corporation could not make an assignment of its rights to 
Plaintiff Paul Gardner. The Plaintiff corporation was dissolved 
prior to entry into the contract at issue and never reinstated. 
The contract was in no way related to the statutory entitlement 
to "wind up the affairs of the corporation", lacked an essential 
element (i.e. 2nd party) and was therefore void. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL ERRED IN ASSESSING INAPPROPRIATE DAMAGES 
BASED UPON THE FULL VALUE OF 3 0% OF THE TOTAL PRIME 
USAGE WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAD PURCHASED ONLY 10% OWNERSHIP 
IN THE ENTITY, FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF NON-
PEAK WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY CONVERTED TO PEAK 
"SUMMER" WEEKS, AND IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
SUBSEQUENTLY FORMED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF 
The measure of damages applied by the trial court was 
improper since Plaintiffs failed to prove that they had been 
denied usage of the boat. Testimony presented that they had "not 
used the boat" fell short of the requirement to prove denial of 
usage. Furthermore, the court awarded damages based upon the 
total value of the prime summer weeks rather than on the 
difference between the value of those weeks and the weeks which 
were admittedly made available to Plaintiffs. Finally, the trial 
court erred in assessing attorney's fees against Defendants under 
a provision of the void contract. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT HIS 
NEPHEW WAS A PRINCIPAL IN THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND 
A BUSINESS PARTNER OF PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER, IN 
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE 
The issues of the case were extremely fact sensitive, and 
hinged upon the credibility of the only two participants in the 
execution of the contract, Plaintiff Paul Gardner and Defendant 
Kenneth Madsen. Unbeknownst to Defendants, an incorporator and 
director of the corporate Plaintiff is the nephew of the trial 
judge. At trial on three separate occasions the name of this 
nephew, his affiliation to the corporate Plaintiff and the fact 
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that he was a "business partner and close friend" of Plaintiff 
Paul Gardner were disclosed. As soon as Defendants became aware 
of the family relationship they filed a Motion for New Trial and 
Reassignment of Judge, which motion was denied. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ALL OF THEIR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION 
AT TRIAL AND ON THIS APPEAL 
Plaintiffs' filing of the second case in the face of the 
summary judgment previously granted by Judge Frederick rises to 
the requisite standard of § 78-27-56 which entitles Defendants to 
an award of their costs and attorney's fees incurred both at 
trial and on this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 
As set forth in the facts above, Plaintiff NUF, Inc. (NUF 1) 
brought an action arising out of the June 15, 1990 contract 
before Judge J. Dennis Frederick as Civil No. 93 0903 925. Judge 
Frederick granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
basis that NUF 1 was the party to the contract, but that since 
the corporation had been dissolved there was no legal entity 
capable of bringing an action on its behalf. (R 141) That case 
involved the same parties in interest, although Paul Gardner was 
not named personally, and the subsequently filed Limited 
Liability Company was not name specifically as a party defendant. 
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From the time that the first complaint was resolved by 
summary judgment and until the time that the second complaint was 
filed there arose no additional causes of action. In fact, there 
were no additional transactions of any kind between the 
respective parties in interest and their privies. 
Plaintiffs have merely attempted to circumvent the doctrine 
of res judicata by naming as a party plaintiff the person who was 
the real party in interest in the first case and by adding a new 
party defendant. 
Recently, the Supreme Court analyzed the concepts of 
collateral estoppel and res judicata in the matter of Jones, 
Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough v. Jerilyn Shelton Dawson, 298 Utah 
Adv. Rep 8 (1996) citing Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629 
(Utah 1995) Justice Howe stated that 
"...issue preclusion prevents the parties 
from relitigating issues resolved in a prior 
related action. The parties seeking 
collateral estoppel must first satisfy four 
requirements. First, the issue challenged 
must be identical in the previous action and 
the case at hand. The issue must have been 
decided in a final judgment on the merits in 
the previous action. Third, the issue must 
have been completely, fully, and fairly 
litigated in the previous action. Fourth, 
the party against whom collateral estoppel is 
invoked in the current action must have been 
either a party or privy to a party in the 
previous action." Id. at 4 citing Sevy 
(other citations omitted) 
In the case at hand, Plaintiff NUF, Inc. brought the 
identical contract claim against Defendants Madsen, the parties 
with whom they entered into their contract. As cited above, with 
the exception of the addition of Paul Gardner as a named 
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Plaintiff and the Limited Liability Company as a named Defendant, 
the first five counts of Plaintiff's second complaint were 
verbatim the same as the first complaint. The sixth count, 
although adding a purported cause of action against the Limited 
Liability Company, did not raise any issues that did not exist at 
the time that Judge Frederick entered his judgment. 
On the second criteria, Judge Frederick's summary judgment 
was, in fact, a final judgment on the merits based upon existing 
law. 
The third criteria is also satisfied in that the issues were 
fully presented to Judge Frederick fully and completely in an 
exhaustive brief by Plaintiffs. At no time have Plaintiffs 
claimed that the issue was not competently presented to Judge 
Frederick. 
With respect to the fourth criteria, Paul Gardner's 
testimony throughout the trial clearly indicated that NUF, Inc. 
was a closely held corporation, which he treated almost as an 
"alter ego". Although he was not physically named in the first 
case, as president of NUF, Inc. he was clearly privy to that 
party in the previous action. 
In the earlier case of Jacobsen v. Jacobsenf 703 P.2d 303 
(Utah 1985) Justice Durham citing Mendenhall v. Kingston, 610 
P.2d 1287, 1289 (Utah 1980) defined the doctrine of res judicata 
as follows: 
"When there has been a adjudication, it 
becomes res judicata as to those issues which 
were either tried and determined or upon all 
issues which the party had a fair opportunity 
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to present and have determined in the other 
proceeding. Jacobsen at 3 05. 
Gardner and NUF, Inc. were capable of presenting all of the 
issues claimed in the second case when the matter was presented 
to Judge Frederick for summary judgment in the first case. 
Particularly, in light of Defendant's Motions to Dismiss and 
Motions for Summary Judgment in the second case on the basis of 
res judicata and the dissolution of the corporation, the burden 
was placed upon Plaintiffs to show that for some reason they were 
unable to present any additional claims that were made in the 
second case. Plaintiffs failed to do so, and their failure 
estops them from denying that the second action was barred by the 
doctrine. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONTRARY TO THE 
CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT, 
PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER RATHER THAN NUF, INC. HAD A 
CONTRACTUAL CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS MADSEN 
"To preserve the sanctity of written instruments, the intent 
of the parties to a written integrated contract should be found 
within the four corners of that instrument.!l Stanger v. Sentinel 
Sec. Life Ins. Co., 669 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1983) citing Utah Valley 
Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981) (emphasis in original.) 
"The doctrine of partial integration is that where a 
written contract is obviously not, or is shown not to 
be, the complete contract, parol evidence not 
inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show 
what the entire contract really was, by supplementing 
as distinguished from contradicting, the writing". Id. 
at 1205. 
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In the present case there is no finding by the court, nor 
was there any evidence admitted at the trial, that the contract 
in question was incomplete. Within the "four corners" of the 
contract, the Buyer was "NUF, Inc. a Utah Corporation" and the 
Sellers were defined as Kenneth Madsen and Marilyn Madsen. The 
clarity of this position, and the intent of the parties is 
further substantiated by the manner in which the contract was 
signed on behalf of Buyer, i.e. "NUF, Inc. by [Gardner's 
signature]". The signature form was handwritten by Plaintiff 
Paul Gardner on the June 15, 1990 contract and on the undated 
supplemental change shown on the last page of the contract (when 
NUF 1 purported to purchase an additional interest in wave 
runners). (Pi Exh. 11; Def Exh. 2) 
In Stanger, the Supreme Court allowed parol evidence, but it 
was on an issue that was not specifically covered by the written 
contract. In the case at hand, the parties are clearly defined 
and no parol evidence is necessary to make that determination. 
More recently this Court has ruled in Sprouse v. Jager, 8 06 P.2d 
219 (Utah App. 1991) that: 
"The settled rule for interpreting a contract 
is to first 'look to the four corners of the 
agreement to determine the intention of the 
parties. The use of extrinsic evidence is 
permitted only if the document appears to 
incompletely express the parties' agreement 
or if it is ambiguous in expressing that 
agreement'." citing Ron Case Roofing and 
Asphalt, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 
1385 (Utah 1989) (other citations omitted) 
The law is clear that there are essential requirements to 
any contract. These elements are (1) proper subject matter; (2) 
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an offer and acceptance; (3) competent parties; and (4) 
appropriate consideration. Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals, 
Inc., 758 P.2d 460 (Utah App. 1988) See also Sugarhouse Finance 
Company v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). 
Although paragraph 4 of the contract at issue here is not as 
artfully drafted by Defendants as would be the case had the 
contract been prepared by legal counsel, the Utah Supreme Court 
has made it clear on numerous occasions that the contract should 
be interpreted "in accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning 
of the words used." Ephraim Theater Company v. Hawk, 1321 P.2d 
223, 7 Utah 2nd 166 (Utah 1958) The Ephraim court held that: 
"The understanding thus expressed is plain 
and provides no justification for a finding 
based upon conduct, that the defendants had a 
firm obligation to pay the rent regardless of 
income from the business. Unless uncertainty 
opens the door to extraneous explanation, the 
trial court is in no position of advantage in 
interpreting documents, and his views thereon 
are not indulged any special credit as are 
findings on issues of fact." id. at 167, fn 
2. 
For the trial court to find, contrary to the specific and 
unambiguous terms of the contract itself that the agreement was 
between Paul Gardner personally and Madsens is clearly an abuse 
of discretion. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE PROPER 
LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS THAT THE CORPORATE 
PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN DISSOLVED PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO THE 
CONTRACT AND THAT THE CONTRACT OR ANY ATTEMPT TO ASSIGN 
RIGHTS UNDER THAT CONTRACT WAS THEREFORE VOID 
Plaintiff NUF Inc. (NUF 1) was dissolved on May 1, 1990. No 
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action was ever taken to reinstate the corporation. § 16-10-
88.2(4) of the Utah Code Annotated, as in effect on June 15, 
1990, provides that: 
The dissolution of any corporation precludes 
that corporation from doing business in its 
corporate character under any name or assumed 
names filed on behalf of the dissolved 
corporation under Section 42-2-5. (Emphasis 
added) 
Subsection 5 of that section did, at that time, provide for 
a reinstatement within one (1) year after the dissolution, 
subject to certain conditions: 
(5) Any corporation which has been dissolved 
under this section may, within one year from 
the date of dissolution, be reinstated upon 
application and payment of all past due 
taxes, penalties, and reinstatement fees. 
There is no evidence in the record that NUF, Inc. made any 
effort at reinstatement. In fact, the principals filed a new 
corporation, by the same name, for the purported purpose of 
"continuing the business operation of NUF, Inc., a prior Utah 
corporation". (R 31) 
Finally, § 16-10-100 of the Utah Business Corporation Act 
then in effect provided that a corporation may pursue any 
remedies available to it so long as the action is commenced 
within two years of the dissolution. 
"The dissolution of a corporation either (1) 
by the issuance of a Certificate of 
Dissolution by the Division of Corporations 
and Commercial Code, ... shall not take away 
any remedy available to or against the 
corporation, its directors, officers or 
shareholders, for any right or claim 
existing, or any liability incurred, prior to 
such dissolution if action or other 
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proceeding thereon is commenced within two 
years after the date of such dissolution." 
The Utah Court of Appeals interpreted this provision in tne 
case of Murphy v. Croslandf 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994). This 
Court said that a corporation does not have authority to conduct 
business when its right to conduct business has been suspended. 
Id at 80. 
In a case analogous to the one at hand, the Utah Supreme 
Court, in analyzing a contract dispute involving a municipal 
corporation stated that: 
Any contract, express or implied, between 
plaintiffs and the county is subject to the 
statutory and constitutional limitations on 
the county as a governing body. The county 
only has those rights and powers granted it 
by the Utah Constitution and statutes or 
those implied as a necessary means to 
accomplish them. Any act by the county in 
excess of this authority or forbidden by the 
Utah Constitution is null and void as an 
ultra vires act. Weese v. Davis County 
Commission, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992). 
It is also clear that when a purported contract is missing 
an essential material element, then the contract is void. By 
analogy, if one party is precluded by law from entering into a 
marriage, but purports to do so, then the marriage contract is 
considered to be void ab initio. Anderson v. Anderson, 240 P.2d 
966, 121 Utah 237 (Utah 1952). 
In their memorandum in opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judge Plaintiffs' claimed standing under the common law 
as a de facto corporation. However, under the common law, a 
corporation was considered to be extinct for all purposes once it 
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had been dissolved. 19 Am Jur 2d Corporations, Section 2838. 
In 1994 this Court verified this position in the case of 
Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994) when it said: 
No corporation de facto could exist under the 
common law where the corporation's charter 
had been revoked by judicial decree or 
statutory forfeiture [amounting to 
involuntary dissolution]. Fletcher Sec. 3844, 
cited in Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d at 78 
(Utah App. 1994). 
This case dealt with the Utah Business Corporation Act which 
was in effect in 1990, prior to the 1992 amendments. Crosland 
Industries, Inc. was suspended for failure to file an annual 
report in 1987 and was dissolved in 1988 for failure to restore 
its good standing. 
The Murphy court continued: 
"According to a number of cases, a 
corporation which has been dissolved...is not 
even a de facto corporation for the reason 
that there can be no corporation de facto 
when there cannot be a corporation de jure, 
and that there can be no color of corporate 
existence after the corporate death." Ld at 
78. 
More recently, in the case of Holman v. Callisterf Duncan & 
Nebeker, 905 P.2d 895 (Utah App. 1995), in the context of a 
malpractice action brought by principals of a dissolved 
corporation against their attorneys, this Court reaffirmed that: 
"Under a common law the corporation ceased to exist at 
dissolution," citing Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 
342, 350-51, 213 P. 187, 190 (1922). For that reason, a 
dissolved corporation was 
"incapable of maintaining an action; and all 
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such actions pending at the time of 
dissolution abate, in the absence of a 
statute to the contrary." citing Holman v. 
Callister, Duncan & Nebekerf 905 P.2d at 897-
898, also citing Chicago Title and Trust Co. 
v. 4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 402 U.S. 120, 
125, 58 S.Ct. 125, 127, 82 L.Ed. 147 (1937). 
Similarly, under the common law: 
"If a state has already acted to terminate 
the corporation's existence, a private party 
may raise the lack of corporate existence as 
a defense to an action involving purely 
private rights." 19 Am Jur 2d Corporations, 
Section 2825 (citing Hearth Corp. v. C.B.R. 
Dev. Co.. 210 NW2d 632 (Iowa). 
In this case, Defendants clearly raised the lack of 
corporate existence as a defense to the action. (R 13 and 12 0) 
In fact, it was this defense which resulted in Judge Frederick 
granting summary judgment against Plaintiffs in the original 
case. It was the subject of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss in 
this action, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Plaintiffs' claim against Defendants clearly involved a private 
contract right, as opposed to a public policy right. Id. at 635. 
Pursuant to the statutes set forth in the Utah Business 
Corporations Act as it existed in 1990, § 16-10-88.2 clearly sets 
forth that the corporations' authority to conduct business as 
usual has been suspended. 
"The dissolution of a corporation becomes 
operative for all purposes at the termination 
of the period allowed by statute for the 
settlement and winding up of its affairs; as 
a general rule, it becomes entirely extinct 
as a corporation, and its powers cease." 19 
Am Jur 2d Corporations, Section 2840 (citing 
Clark v. American Cannel Coal Co., 165 Ind 
213, 73 NE 1083; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Dunscomb, 108 Tenn 724, 69 SW 345). 
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This provision was interpreted in Murphy v. Crosland, where 
this Court said that 
"...corporate suspension under UBCA section 
16-10-88.2 resulted in suspension of a 
corporation's authority to conduct business 
as usual. A corporation suspended under this 
statute could engage only in activities 
necessary to wind up its affairs or to remedy 
its suspension. UBCA Section 16-10-139 
applies to a suspended corporation; anyone 
acting on the corporations' behalf who 
exceeds the corporations remaining authority 
is jointly and severally liable for debts and 
liabilities incurred as a result." Id. at 
84. 
The Murphy court refers to a footnote in the Utah Supreme 
Court case of MacKay and Knobel Enters, v. Teton Van Gas, Inc., 
460 P.2d at 829 (1969) in which the Court defined the concept of 
winding up its affairs to include protection of assets, paying 
creditors and "otherwise winding up its business." Id. fn. 17. 
In making its finding that Plaintiff Paul Gardner should 
have the benefit of the NUF contract, the trial court appears to 
have extrapolated the statutory extension of liability referred 
to in § 16-10-139 above. (R. 277 at P3 L16 through P4 L5) This 
ruling is clearly inconsistent with this Court's ruling in 
Holman. In that case as this, the plaintiff either held or 
controlled all of the shares of stock of the defunct corporation. 
Holman was the sole director or officer of the defunct 
corporation, and Holman personally relied on the advice given by 
the attorney against whom the malpractice claim was made. Holman 
at 899. 
It is interesting to note that Mr. Holman also claimed that 
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he had been personally damaged as a result of the negligent 
services performed on behalf of the defunct corporation, as a 
result of an implied attorney-client relationship, but that this 
Court was not willing to extend any corporate remedies to him as 
a result of that claim. 
Although § 16-10-100 of the Utah Code Annotated (repealed 
July 1, 1992) did provide a 2 year period during which the 
principals of a corporation could pursue a claim on behalf of the 
corporation, even the first action filed by Plaintiffs in this 
matter was filed more than two years after the date of the 
dissolution. In Holman, this Court refused to allow Plaintiff to 
proceed on the basis of this statute." Id. at 8 97. The same 
rule should apply in this case. 
Since NUF, Inc. was dissolved prior to the date of the 
contract, then Paul Gardner had no legal capacity to enter into 
the contract with Defendants. Since that left the contract 
without the requisite parties, the contract was void. And, 
although the statute provides that Paul Gardner may be personally 
liable for the tort and contract damages incurred by Defendants 
as a result of his acting without authority, neither the statutes 
nor the case law provide a basis for Mr. Gardner to benefit from 
his violation of the statutes. 
Although the trial court was concerned that there had been 
an assignment of the corporation's rights to Mr. Gardner, such an 
assignment would be clearly impossible under the facts of the 
case. (R 277 at P3, 1-15) Specifically, although Plaintiffs 
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provided no specific dates, no minutes, no resolutions nor any 
other documentation regarding an assignment, it is clear that the 
meeting at which they claimed the assignment took place occurred 
prior to June 15, 1990, the date on which the contract was 
executed. (Tl at 125) Since Plaintiffs claim that the meeting 
took place before May 1, 1990, then no contract had been entered 
into and therefore no rights existed which were capable of 
assignment. Similarly, there is no evidence of any consideration 
transferred from Mr. Gardner to the corporation, that being an 
essential element of such an assignment. Finally, any 
provisional or assignment of future rights would have ceased to 
exist on May 1, 1990, when the corporation was dissolved. 
Clearly, entry into a new contract for use of a houseboat 
did not fit within the purview of the statutory two year 
extension. Similarly, it is clear that the period of two years 
had long since expired prior to Mr. Gardner filing either of the 
actions against Madsens on behalf of the dissolved corporation. 
After dissolution, NUF, Inc. had no powers to enter into a 
contract, nor did it have any power granted from the state of 
Utah to pursue any litigation against Defendants. As in Weese, 
the purported contract was null and void. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ASSESSING DAMAGES BASED UPON 
THE FULL VALUE OF 30% OF THE TOTAL PRIME USAGE WHEN 
PLAINTIFFS HAD PURCHASED ONLY 10% OWNERSHIP IN THE 
ENTITY, FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE VALUE OF NON-PEAK 
WEEKS WHICH HAD BEEN EFFECTIVELY CONVERTED TO PEAK 
"SUMMER" WEEKS, AND IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
SUBSEQUENTLY FORMED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY WAS 
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGES TO PLAINTIFF 
The Restatement of Contracts 2d recognizes that judicial 
remedies for breach of contract serve to protect one or more of 
the following interests of a promisee: 
11(a) his 'expectation interest', which is the interest 
in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good 
a position as he would have been in had the contract been 
performed; 
(b) his 'reliance interest', which is his interest in 
being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract 
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in 
had the contract not been made; or 
(c) his 'restitution interest', which is his interest 
in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred 
on the other party." (cited in 22 Am Jur 2d, Damage, § 43) 
By way of explanation to subparagraph a, Am Jur provides the 
following: 
"Contract damages are ordinarily based on the 
injured party's expectation interest and are 
intended to give him the benefit of the 
bargain by awarding a sum of money that will, 
to the extent possible, put him in as good a 
position as he would have been in had the 
contract been performed. Moreover, his 
recovery is limited to the loss he has 
actually suffered by reason of the breach; he 
is not entitled to be placed in a better 
position than he would have been in if the 
contract had not been broken". 22 Am Jur 2d 
Damages, Section 45. 
At trial Plaintiff Gardner made some broad sweeping 
allegations regarding unavailability of requested dates, but 
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provided only one instance where he had been actually been denied 
the use of the houseboat. (Tl at 64-65) That denial was for Week 
#27 of 1993 which was declared by Madsens to be "forfeited" as a 
result of Gardner's repeated violation of the houseboat rules, 
the most recent of which had arisen from the conclusive proof 
obtained by Madsens that Gardner had kept his dog on the 
houseboat during the first week of usage in June of 1993 . There 
is a major gap between Mr. Gardner simply not scheduling the boat 
for use and his being deprived of usage by Defendants. 
In reality, simple arithmetic leads to the conclusion that 
10% of the houseboat usage during a calendar year would entitle 
an owner to 5.2 weeks usage, with that usage spread 
proportionately throughout the year. Under such a proportional 
distribution, 2 of those weeks would be treated as "summer" weeks 
under the court's definition. R 277, P 14, L 22) With a 
reasonable expectation of down-time for repairs on the boat of 2 
weeks, each 10% owner would then be entitled to 5 weeks usage 
throughout the year, which is exactly what the unmodified 
contract provided. That is consistent with both parties 
testimony regarding the expectation of additional partners, and 
particularly Mr. Madsen's testimony that they anticipated a total 
of 4 additional owners besides themselves in order to spread the 
maintenance costs but retain at least 55% ownership in the boat, 
as stated in the contract. (Tl at 239) As shown on his copy of 
the contract, Mr. Madsen did agree that he had changed five weeks 
to six weeks and had initialled that change. (Tl at 240, D. Exh. 
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2) Clearly this is not a major shift in usage, and could be 
easily absorbed from the Madsens' retaining interest. However, 
to have agreed to six or seven summer weeks for one 10% owner, as 
claimed by Plaintiff, would have resulted in the loss of 30-35% 
of the prime summer weeks. Clearly Madsens could not sustain 
such an allocation with a total of 4 partners if each had 10% 
particularly if each received the same deal. 
If it was the intent of the contract to provide six weeks, 
then two would be prime "summer" weeks which was defined by the 
court as May 1 through September 30. R 277, P 14, L 22), then 
the remaining 4 would be non-peak weeks for which the non-peak 
rental rate would be the comparable measure of value to that 
accepted by the trial court. 
Therefore, even if the court found that Plaintiffs were 
entitled to 6 summer weeks, given the fact that there was no 
evidence that non-peak weeks were withheld, the appropriate 
measure of Plaintiffs' damages would be the value of the premium 
weeks less the value of the non-premium weeks which were actually 
made available. Unfortunately, the court refused to allow 
testimony as to the value of non-peak weeks, although Defendants' 
Exhibit 3 which was admitted does show a non-peak value of $1199 
per week. Therefore, if the non-peak weeks were worth $1199 and 
the court found that the summer weeks were worth $18 00, then 
Plaintiffs would be entitled to the difference between the two or 
$601 per week for each week which they prove that they were 
denied usage. 
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By totally disregarding the value of the non-peak weeks, the 
court grossly inflated the damages awarded to Plaintiffs, thereby 
resulting in an award that was nearly 8 times the original 
purchase price for the contract. (R 414-415) 
Finally, in making its calculation of damages, the court 
found that Plaintiffs had utilized the boat during 6 weeks, when 
by the testimony of Paul Gardner he admitted having used the boat 
for 9 weeks. (R 277, P 14, cf Tl at 63, 18-19) 
In actuality, since the contract with NUF 1 was void, 
Madsens are entitled to damages under either subsection b or 
subsection c of the Restatement of Contracts 2d, cited above. In 
order to return Madsens to a position as good as they would have 
been in had they not relied upon the contract, Madsens should be 
reimbursed in the amount of $18 00 per week for a minimum of the 9 
weeks which Plaintiff Gardner testified that he used the boat, 
plus reimbursement for the damages actually caused to the boat by 
Plaintiffs during periods of their exclusive use and control. 
Under subsection c of the Restatement position, Defendants 
would be entitled to the value of any benefit that they conferred 
upon Plaintiffs. As noted in Am Jur 2d 
"Restitution is a common form of relief in 
contract cases. Its objective is not the 
enforcement of the contract through 
protection of a party's expectation or 
reliance interests, but the prevention of 
unjust enrichment. The restitution interest 
is the interest of the non-defaulting party 
in the benefit which he conferred on the 
person in default of the contract and prior 
to its breach." 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, 
Section 54. 
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In this particular case, the position in subsections b and c 
essentially go "hand in glove" with each other. That usage which 
was conferred upon Plaintiffs was the same usage which was denied 
to Defendants. 
The more difficult question is whether or not defendants are 
entitled to restitution for the costs of the damages caused to 
the boat during the time that it was under the exclusive control 
of Plaintiff Paul Gardner. As mentioned above, the trial court 
found that Defendants had failed to prove negligence on the part 
of Plaintiffs with respect to the major damage to the outdrives 
and engines. In doing so, the court ignored the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur with respect to those issues, while obviously 
applying that doctrine to the damage that was caused to the 
refrigerator while the boat was under Gardner's control. (R 277 
at P 12, 15-16) 
Defendants admittedly could not prove that they observed 
Plaintiffs negligent operation of the boat which caused the 
damage to the propellers and outdrives, but they did provide 
testimony that when the boat was used last prior to Mr. Gardner 
taking the boat it was in good working order and that when it was 
next observed after Gardner's usage, the damage was discovered. 
(Tl at 209-217) 
Unfortunately, any case involving damages or negligence 
outside the presence of a third party is a difficult fact issue. 
The trier of fact has broad discretion in making its findings. 
Therefore, the impartiality of the judge is even more essential 
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to the integrity of the legal process in situations like this. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISCLOSE THAT HIS 
NEPHEW WAS A PRINCIPAL IN THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATION AND 
A BUSINESS PARTNER OF PLAINTIFF PAUL GARDNER, IN 
FAILING TO RECUSE HIMSELF AND IN FAILING TO GRANT A NEW 
TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE 
The evidence is undisputed that Clayton H. Wilkinson is the 
nephew of the trial judge, Homer F. Wilkinson. As the son of 
Judge Wilkinson's brother, Clayton Wilkinson clearly fits in to 
the definition of a "third-degree relationship" as set forth in 
the Code of Judicial Conduct. (See Appendix B) It is undisputed 
that Defendants had no knowledge of the family relationship 
between the Judge and his nephew until well after the completion 
of the trial. (R 345-346) The evidence is undisputed that on 
receiving information regarding a possible conflict Defendants 
took timely action to verify the allegation and then promptly 
filed their Motion for New Trial and Reassignment of Judge. (R 
343-346) Finally, it is clear that Judge Wilkinson never gave any 
indication to the parties that Clayton Wilkinson was, in fact, 
his nephew or that there was any possibility of a conflict of 
interest due to that relationship. 
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a very stringent view 
toward the disqualification of judges when there is an apparent 
conflict of interest. The stringency of this posture was clearly 
set forth in the case of Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 
83 0 P.2d 252 (Utah 1992) where the Supreme Court reversed a 
unanimous Court of Appeals decision under circumstances where one 
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of the three judges was related by marriage to two partners in a 
law firm representing one of the parties before the court. The 
relationship in that case was brother-in-law and father-in-law, 
and there was no indication that Judge Billings would share in 
any pecuniary interest as a result of her relationship; the 
relatives had no visible participation in the case. id. at 254. 
In Regional Sales Agency, Inc. Appellant challenged Judge 
Billings participation on three grounds: 
"First, Section 78-7-1 of the Code requires 
judicial disqualification when the judge has 
a relationship of consanguinity or affinity 
within the third degree of a "party" to the 
action, Utah Code Ann. Sec 78-7-1(1) (b) 
(1991); second, canon 3(C)(1)(d) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Conduct ("U.C.J.C") 
requires disqualification when a judge 
presides over a case in which relatives 
within the third degree of relationship have 
an "interest" that would be "affected by the 
outcome," U.C.J.C. canon 3(C)(1)(d)(1990); 
and third, canon 2 of the U.C.J.C. requires 
disqualification in circumstances that create 
an appearance of judicial impropriety, 
U.C.J.C. canon 2 (1990). Id. at 255, 256. 
The Supreme Court did not reach the first and third 
objections, since the matter was reversed on the second ground. 
Id. at 256. 
The facts of that case were similar to those in the instant 
action since the party raising the disqualification issue was not 
aware of the conflict of interest at the time that the matter was 
heard and decided in the Court. Id. at 254. As in this case, 
appellant made no contention that the judge's failure to 
disqualify herself was either "intentional or malicious" or that 
the judge would have acted differently if the firm to which her 
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relatives by marriage had not been involved. Id. at 256. 
Appellant there did argue, however that the judge's participation 
in the case created..."an appearance of impropriety" _Id. at 256. 
As this case, the Regional Sales Agency, Inc.f relationship 
between the judge in question and the interested party 
was..."within the third-degree of relationship to Judge...or her 
husband." Id. at 256. 
In determining "an interest that could be substantially 
affected," the Regional Sales Agency court analyzed several 
factors and ultimately reached a "brightline proscription". Id. 
at 257. Judge Zimmerman stated that proscription as follows: 
We therefore conclude that under Canon 3, a 
relative of the requisite degree of 
relationship has an "interest" that might be 
sufficiently "affected by the outcome" of a 
case in every situation where a judge sits on 
a case in which the judge's relative is a 
partner or otherwise an equity participant in 
a firm that represents a party to the case, 
id at 257 (emphasis in original) 
In this case, Clayton Wilkinson is not an attorney partner 
in a law firm but he is clearly a "partner or otherwise an equity 
participant" in the Plaintiff corporation and partner with 
Plaintiff Gardner. Judge Wilkinson knew this on at least 3 
different occasions. In one instance Mr. Gardner testified that 
the nephew was his "business partner in the real estate company". 
(Tl at 124, 2-4) In spite of those revelations, Judge Wilkinson 
gave no indication that he had a nephew with the name Clayton 
Wilkinson, nor did he take any other action which might 
reasonably place Defendants on notice of the conflict of 
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interest. 
In Regional Sales Agency, Justice Howe in his dissent 
expresses a concern that appellant had not made a timely and 
appropriate objection at the time that the matter was before the 
Court of Appeals. Ld. at 25 9- The majority however felt that the 
issue of judicial integrity was so significant that the issue 
must be dealt with in any event. That logic is even more 
compelling here since the trial judge did know of the 
relationship, but failed to disclose the fact. 
Finally, in Regional Sales Agency the appellate court judge 
disqualified was one of 3 judges who had voted unanimously on the 
case, under circumstances where the issues over which those 
judges had power were significantly narrowed by the Rules of 
Appellate Procedure and the fact that the court was more 
concerned with legal issues than fine-line factual 
determinations. As was set forth above, as the trier of fact in 
this case, Judge Wilkinson was empowered to make factual 
determinations within a wide range of discretionary power. The 
issues which he decided were hotly contested, and hinged on his 
determination as to the credibility of witnesses giving 
diametrically opposed testimony. In making his factual 
determinations, he also apparently disregarded the unopposed 
testimony of the forensic document expert. 
Under these circumstances the integrity of the judicial 
system is far more susceptible to challenge as a result of the 
appearance of a very significant conflict of interest on the part 
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of the trier of fact than was the case in Regional Sales. 
Just as the Supreme Court remanded Regional Sales Agency to 
the Court of Appeals for a new hearing before a different panel, 
if this Court finds that there is a contract and a party with an 
enforceable interest to that contract, then this matter should be 
remanded to the District Court for a new trial before a judge who 
has not previously participated in the case. 
POINT VI 
APPELLANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THE ACTION AT TRIAL AND 
ON THIS APPEAL 
Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Utah Code of Appellate Procedure, 
parties to an appeal are entitled to their costs on appeal. 
Similarly, where the trial court has awarded attorney's fees 
below, the appellate court may award attorney's fees on appeal 
where authorized by statute or rule of court. Christensen v. 
Abbott, 671 P.2d 121,123 (Utah 1983). 
It is also clear that where a contract provides for 
attorney's fees, they should be awarded on appeal. The rule 
defined by Justice Wilkins is: 
"We therefore adopt the rule of law that a 
provision of payment for attorney's fees in a 
contract includes attorney's fees incurred by 
the prevailing party on appeal as well as at 
trial, if the action is brought to enforce 
the contract..." Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Assoc, 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 
1980) 
In the present case, Appellant is faced with having incurred 
very substantial attorney's fees in defending 2 actions brought 
by Plaintiffs on a void contract, where the party to that 
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contract has been dissolved. The question then becomes whether 
Appellants should be entitled to their costs and attorney's fees 
pursuant to the underlying contract provision when the contract 
itself is void. Case law on this point is non-existent, but the 
court can unquestionably award these costs and fees pursuant to 
statute. 
Section 78-26-56 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) provides for an award of attorney's fees when there is 
no contractual provision. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party if the court determines that the action 
or defense of the action was without merit 
and not brought or asserted in good faith 
under Subsection (2). 
In Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1993) citing the 
case of Cadv v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983) the 
Supreme Court defined.... 
"without merit" means "frivolous" or "having 
no basis in law or fact" for purpose of § 78-
27-56, we found the terms "lack of good 
faith" and "bad faith" to be synonymous. To 
establish bad faith, one or more of the 
following must be lacking: 
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the 
activities in question; 
(2) no intent to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; 
(3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact 
that the activities in question will,[sic] 
hinder, delay or defraud others."id. at 1199 
In the case before the court, Defendants have clearly 
demonstrated the requisite bad faith to warrant an award of 
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attorney's fees under this provision. In the first case they 
brought an action on behalf of a dissolved corporation with no 
standing in the courts, on a contract that was void. While there 
may be an argument that this was or could have been done in the 
furtherance of any arguable claim, such is clearly not the case 
with the second action brought by the same attorney and the same 
principals. At the time that Plaintiffs filed this action there 
had already been a determination by Judge Frederick in the first 
case that there was no cause of action. To bring a second 
action, utilizing a complaint that was essentially the same 
document as the first complaint, (with the exception of adding 
the real party in interest as Plaintiff, and a related party in 
interest as a Defendant) does not meet the test for good faith. 
Clearly any rights which Mr. Gardner had, if any, existed prior 
to the filing of the first complaint. Similarly, the latter 
named Limited Liability Company which was named in the second 
case as a Defendant existed at the time that the first complaint 
was filed, and any allegations subsequently made by Plaintiffs 
against that entity transpired prior to the entry of the 
unappealed judgment against them on the first complaint. 
Mr. Gardner, as the moving party in both cases was clearly 
"privy" to the Plaintiff in the first case and all issues raised 
in the second case could have been litigated prior to entry of 
the first judgment. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough v. 
Jerilvn Shelton Dawson, 2 98 Utah Adv. Rep 8 (1996) and Jacobsen 
v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303 (Utah 1985). Plaintiffs' conduct in 
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this case is as much bad faith as the proscribed conduct in 
Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Ut. App. 1993) 
where this Court awarded attorney's fees and double costs. JEd at 
62. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial in this matter should never have continued after 
the mention of Clayton H. Wilkinson and his relationship to 
Plaintiffs in the case. Had the fact of that relationship been 
revealed by the trial judge Defendants would have understandably 
asked for a disqualification and a new trial. Unfortunately, the 
court gave no indication of the conflict nor any disclosure of 
the relationship. This conflict of interest clouds the entire 
proceeding and casts serious doubt upon the integrity of the 
judicial system, particularly in light of the gross 
inconsistencies between the rulings made by Judge Wilkinson in 
this case and those on the same issues when they were previously 
presented to Judge Frederick on the earlier case. 
To reach the ruling which he did, the court had to disregard 
the claims of res judicata and corporate dissolution that were 
thoroughly briefed in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion 
for Summary Judgment. He further had to disregard the clear and 
unambiguous content of the written content and the uncontradicted 
testimony of the forensic document expert. The court also 
ignored the fact that Plaintiffs failed to prove "denial11 of 
usage and the obvious contradictions and mis-statements and 
testimony of Paul Gardner and his wife Beverly Gardner. 
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The court awarded monetary damages to Plaintiffs that were 
clearly inconsistent with what they had proved to have been 
"denied usage". The court's measure of damages also ignored the 
residual value of the weeks that were unquestionably made 
available to Plaintiffs, by awarding them the entire value of 
each summer week. In fact, those damages were based upon 6 weeks 
actual usage rather than the 9 weeks as testified to by Plaintiff 
Paul Gardner. 
Finally, the court erred in failing to award costs and 
attorney's fees to Defendants either under the terms of the 
contract itself or pursuant to § 78-27-56 (UCA, 1953) and further 
by making an award of costs and attorney's fees in favor of 
Plaintiffs. 
Appellants therefore respectfully request that this Court 
reverse the trial court's finding as a matter of law with respect 
to the issues of res judicata and corporate dissolution, and 
remand the matter to the district court for trial before a new 
judge on the issue of damages which should be awarded to 
Defendants/Appellants, and on the issue of costs and attorney's 
fees. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J2-& day of February, 1997. 
NEIL B. CRIST 
Attorney for Defendants 
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16-10-88.2 CORPORATIONS 
16-10-38.2. Suspension — Notice — Failure to remove sus-
pension. 
< 1) A domestic corporation that remains delinquent for more than 30 days 
after the mailing of the notice of delinquency under Section 16-10-88.1 shall 
be suspended. If a corporation is suspended under this section or under Section 
59-7-155, the division shall mail a notice of suspension to the corporation, 
unless the corporation's certificate of incorporation is already suspended for 
any reason. A corporation that is suspended continues its corporate existence 
and may carry on any business so long as it also takes the necessary steps to 
remedy its suspended status and restore the corporation to good standing. 
(2) A notice of suspension shall state: 
(a) that the certificate of incorporation of the corporation has been 
suspended; 
(b) the reason for the suspension; 
(c) the date of the suspension; 
(d) that the corporation may remove the suspension by correcting the 
delinquency and paying a reinstatement fee determined by the division 
pursuant to Subsection 63-38-3 (2), or, if its certificate of incorporation 
has been suspended under Section 59-7-155, by complying with the provi-
sions of Section 59-7-157; and 
(ei that the corporation will be dissolved 120 days after the date of 
mailing the notice of suspension unless the corporation has removed the 
suspension before that time. 
(3) The division shall include an annual report form with any notice of 
suspension under this section for failure to file an annual report. 
(4) If the corporation does not remove the suspension within 120 days after 
the date of mailing the notice of suspension, the corporation shall be dissolved; 
the division shall mail a certificate of dissolution to the corporation. No corpo-
ration so dissolved may be revived under this chapter or Section 59-7-157, 
except as set forth in Subsection (OK The dissolution of any corporation pre-
cludes that corporation from doing business in its corporate character under 
any name or assumed names filed on behalf of the dissolved corporation under 
Section 42-2-5. On the date of dissolution, the corporation's right in any as-
sumed names it may use is suspended. The name of the dissolved corporation 
and any assumed names filed on its behalf are not available for one year from 
the date of dissolution for use by any other domestic corporation, foreign 
corporation transacting business in this state, or person doing business under 
an assumed name under Section 42-2-5. 
(5) Any corporation which has been dissolved under this section may, 
within one year from the date of dissolution, be reinstated upon application 
and payment of all past due taxes, penalties, and reinstatement fees. 
(6) All notices and certificates under this section shall be mailed first-class, 
postage prepaid, and shall be addressed separately to the registered agent and 
at least one officer of the corporation who is not the registered agent or to two 
officers if there is no registered agent of record, at their most current mailing 
addresses appearing on the records of the division. 
History: C. 1953, 66-10-38.2, enacted by L. 
1987. ch. 66, § 13; 1983, ch. 222, § 9; 1990, 
ch. 108. § 16. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 66. } 13 repeals former § 66-10-38.2, as en-
acted by Laws 1985. ch. 178. § 57. relating to 
16-10-100, Survival of remedy after dissolution. 
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certificate of 
dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code, or (2) by a 
decree of court when the court has not liquidated the assets and business of 
the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by expiration of its period of 
duration, shall not take away or impair any remedy available to or against 
the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders, for any right or claim 
existing, or any liability incurred, pnjxc £p iv*ru dissolution if action or other 
proceeding thereon is commenced (within two years\after the date of such 
dissolution. Any such action or proceeding b> ur agcLlnst the corporation may 
be prosecuted or defended by the corporation in its corporate name. The share-
holders, directors and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other 
action as shall be appropriate to protect such remedy, right or claim. If such 
corporation was dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such 
corporation may amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such 
period of two years so as to extend its peViod of duration. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 23, § 100; 1984, ch. Meaning of "this act." - See the note un-
6 6 1 § 1 1 5
' der the same catchline following § 16-10-56. 
APPENDIX A 
CHAPTER 12 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
ADOPTED JANUARY 1, 1994 
CANON 
3. A judge shall perform the duties of the 
office impartially and diligently. 
4. A judge shall so conduct the judge's extra-
judicial activities as to minimize the 
risk of conflict with judicial obliga-
tions. 
5. A judge shall refrain from political activity 
inappropriate to the judicial office. 
APPLICABILITY. 
TERMINOLOGY 
"Candidate" means a non-judge seeking selection for judicial office, or a 
judge seeking selection for or retention in judicial or non-judicial office. A 
person becomes a candidate as soon as the person makes a public announce-
ment of candidacy, declares or files as a candidate with the election or ap-
pointment authority, or authorizes solicitation or acceptance of contributions 
or support, whichever occurs first. 
"De minimis" denotes an insignificant interest that could not raise reason-
able question as to a judge's impartiality. 
"Economic interest" denotes ownership of a more than de minimis legal or 
equitable interest, or a relationship as officer, director, advisor, or other active 
participant in the affairs of a party, except that: 
(i) ownership of an interest in a mutual or common investment fund 
that holds securities is not an economic interest in such securities unless 
the judge participates in the management of the fund or a proceeding 
pending or impending before the judge could substantially affect the 
value of the interest; 
(ii) service by a judge as an officer, director, advisor or other active 
participant in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal or civic or-
ganization, or service by a judge's spouse, parent or child as an officer, 
director, advisor or other active participant in any organization, does not 
create an economic interest in securities held by that organization; 
(iii) a deposit in a financial institution, the proprietary interest of a 
policy holder in a mutual insurance company, of a depositor in a mutual 
savings association or of a member in a credit union, or a similar propri-
etary interest, is not an economic interest in the organization unless a 
proceeding pending or impending before the judge could substantially 
affect the value of the interest; 
(iv) ownership of government securities is not an economic interest in 
the issuer unless a proceeding pending or impending before the judge 
could substantially affect the value of the securities. 
"Family" denotes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other 
relative or person with whom the judge maintains a close familial relation-
ship. 
"Fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, trustee, 
and guardian. 
"Judge Pro Tempore." A judge pro tempore is a lawyer who is serving as a 
specially appointed judge pro tempore pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-6-1.5 
or Article VIII, § 4 of the Utah Constitution. 
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Compiler's Notes. — The Code of Judicial 
Conduct is repealed and reenacted effective 
January 1, 1994. 
TERMINOLOGY. 
CANON 
1. A judge shall uphold the integrity and inde-
pendence of the judiciary. 
2. A judge shall avoid impropriety and the ap-
pearance of impropriety in all activi-
ties. 
APPENDIX B 
C a n o n 1 CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION HQQ 
"May" denotes discretionary conduct or conduct that is not covered by spe-
cific proscriptions. 
"Political organization" denotes a political party or other group, the princi-
pal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to 
political office. 
"Shall" and "shall not" impose binding obligations to respectively engage in 
or refrain from the described conduct. The failure to act in accordance with 
those obligations can result in disciplinary action. 
"Should" and "should not" are used to indicate conduct that is respectively 
encouraged or discouraged. The failure to engage in or refrain from such 
conduct cannot result in disciplinary action. 
"Third degree of relationship" denotes the following relatives: great-grand-
parent, grandparent, parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, child, grandchild, 
great-grandchild, nephew or niece. 
CANON 1 
A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND 
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our 
society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, and enforc-
ing, and shall personally observe, high standards of conduct so that the integ-
rity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this 
Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective. 
CANON 2 
A JUDGE SHALL AVOID LMPROPRIETY AND THE 
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES. 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should exhibit con-
duct that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
B. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence 
the judge's judicial conduct or judgment/A judge shall not lend the prestige of 
the judicial office to advance the private interests of others; nor shall a judge 
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special 
.position to influence the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a 
character witness but may provide honest references in the regular course of 
business or social life. 
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other than a religious 
organization, which practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, religion, or national origin. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Consorting with, or maintaining for disciplinary action against judge, 15 
social relations with, criminal figure as ground A.L.R.oth 923. 
CANON 3 
A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM THE DUTIES OF THE OFFICE 
IMPARTIALLY AND DILIGENTLY. 
A. Judicial Duties in General. The judicial duties of a full-time judg« 
take precedence over all the judge's other activities. The judge's judicial dutiei 
include all the duties of the judge's office prescribed by law. In the perfor* 
mance of these duties, the following standards apply. 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge excepi 
those in which disqualification is required or permitted by rule, or traa*' 
fer to another court occurs. 
Canon 3 
<2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional competence. 
A judge shall no-: be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of 
criticism. 
(3) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before 
the judge. 
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, ju-
rors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom the judge deals in an 
official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, and of 
staff, court officials, and others subject to judicial direction and control. 
(5) A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A 
judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by wordi or conduct 
manifest bia3 or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice 
based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual 
orientation or socioeconomic status, and should not permit, and shall use 
all reasonable efforts to deter, stall, court officials and others subject to 
judicial direction and control from doing so. A judge should be alert to 
avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. 
(6) A judge should require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to 
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based 
upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel or others. 
This Canon does not preclude legitimate advocacy when race, sex, reli-
gion, national origin, disability, age, 3exual orientation or socioeconomic 
status, or other similar factors, are issues in the proceeding. 
(7) A judge shall accord to ever/ person who is legally interested in a 
proceeding, or that person^ lawyer, full right to be heard according to 
law. Except as authorized by law, a judge 3hail neither initiate nor con-
sider, and 3hall discourage, ex parte or other communications concerning 
a pending or impending proceeding. A judge may consult with the court 
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in carrying out the judge's 
adjudicative responsibilities or with other judges provided that the judge 
does not abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the case pending 
before the court. No communication respecting a pending or impending 
proceeding shall occur between the trial judge and an appellate court 
unless a copy of any written communication or the substance of any oral 
communication is provided to all parties. A judge may obtain the advice of 
a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before the 
court if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and 
the substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportu-
nity to respond. A judge may, with the consent of the parties either in 
writing or on the record, confer separately with the parties and their 
lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, 
and fairly. 
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in 
any court, make any public comment that might reasonably be expected 
to affect its outcome or impair it3 fairness or make any nonpublic com-
ment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing. A 
judge should require similar abstention on the part of court personnel 
subject to judicial direction and control. This Canon does not prohibit a 
judge from making public 3tatement3 in the course of official duties or 
from explaining for public information the procedures of che court. This 
Canon does not apply to proceedings in which a judge is a litigant in a 
personal capacity. 
(10) A judge shall not commend or criticize juror3 for their verdict 
other than in a court order or opinion in a proceeding but may express 
appreciation to jurors for their service to the judicial system and the 
community. 
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(11) A judge shall not disclose or use, for purposes unrelated to judicial 
duties, information acquired in a judicial capacity that is not available to 
the public. 
(12) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, or recording in 
the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions of 
court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation 
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of 
judicial administration; or 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of in-
vestitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings. 
(13) A judge should prohibit taking photographs (including motion pic-
ture and videotape) in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent 
thereto during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that 
still photographs of the judge and other court personnel, counsel, specta-
tors, parties and witnesses are permissible, subject to restrictions speci-
fied by the court and subject, in the case of parties and witnesses, to their 
advance consent in writing, provided that the court shall specifically for-
bid the taking of any photographs where it finds a substantial likelihood 
that such activity would jeopardize a fair hearing or trial in the matter at 
issue. 
C. Administrative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge shall diligently discharge the judge's administrative re-
sponsibilities without bias or prejudice, maintain professional competence 
in judicial administration, and cooperate with other judges and court 
officials in the administration of court business. 
(2) A judge should require staff, court officials and others subject to 
judicial direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and 
diligence that apply to the judge and to refrain from manifesting bias or 
prejudice in the performance of their official duties. 
(3) A judge with supervisory authority for the judicial performance of 
other judges should take reasonable measures to assure the prompt dispo-
sition of matters before them and the proper performance of their other 
judicial responsibilities. 
(4) A judge shall not make unnecessary appointments, shall exercise 
the power of appointment impartially and on the basis of merit, and shall 
avoid nepotism and favoritism. A judge shall not approve compensation of 
appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
D. Disciplinary Responsibilities. A judge should take or initiate appro-
priate disciplinary measures against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional 
conduct of which the judge may become aware. This section does not apply to 
information generated and communicated under the policies of the Judicial 
Performance Evaluation Program. 
E. Disqualification. 
(1) A judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the 
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or 
a party's lawyer, a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case, 
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding; 
(b) the judge had served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, 
had practiced law with a lawyer who had served in the matter at the 
time of their association, or the judge or such lawyer has been a 
material witness concerning it; 
(c) the judge knows that the judge, individually or as a fiduciary, 
or the judge's spouse, parent or child wherever residing, or any other 
member of the judge's family residing in the judge's household, has 
an economic interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a 
party to the proceeding, or has any other more than de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within the third 
degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a per-
son: 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or 
trustee of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis 
interest that could be substantially affected by the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judged knowledge likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding. 
(2) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary 
economic interests, and should make a reasonable effort to keep informed 
about the personal economic interests of the judge's spouse and minor 
children residing in the judge's household. 
F. Remittal of Disqualification. A judge disqualified by the terms of 
Canon 3E may disclose the basis of the judge's disqualification and ask the 
parties and their lawyers to consider, out of the presence of the judge, whether 
to waive disqualification. If following disclosure of any basis for disqualifica-
tion other than personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, the parties and 
lawyers, without participation by the judge, all agree that the judge need not 
be disqualified, and the judge is then willing to participate, the judge may 
participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall be entered on the record, 
or if written, filed in the case file. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Interest substantially affected. 
Under Subdivision (EXIXdXiii) of this canon, 
a relative of the requisite degree of relation-
ship has an "interest" that might be suffi-
ciently "affected by the outcome*' of a case 
whenever a judge 3it3 on a case in which the 
judge'3 relative is a partner or otherwise an 
equity participant in a firm that represents a 
party to the case. Regional Sales Agency, Inc. 
v. Reichert, 830 ?.2d 252 (Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Note, 
Maintaining Public Confidence in the Integrity 
of the Judiciary: State Bar of Nevada v. 
Claiborne, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 283. 
A.L.R. — Disqualification from criminal 
proceedings of trial judge who earlier presided 
over disposition of case of coparticipant, 72 
A.L.R.4th 651. 
Abuse or misuse of contempt power as 
ground for removal or discipline of judge, 76 
A.L.R.4th 982. 
Disciplinary action against judge for engag-
ing in ex parte communication with attorney, 
party, or witness, 82 A.L.R.4th 567. 
Judge's previous legal association with attor-
ney connected to current case as warranting 
disqualification, 85 A.L.R.4th 700. 
Removal or discipline of state judge for ne-
glect of, or failure to perform, judicial duties, 
87 A.L.R.4th 727. 
Disciplinary action against judge on ground 
of abusive or intemperate language or conduct 
toward attorneys, court personnel, or parties to 
or witnesses in actions, and the like, 89 
A.L.R.4th 273. 
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APPENDIX C 
1 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 1995; A.M. SESSION 
2 J U D G E ' S B E N C H R U L I N G 
3 
4 THE COURT: Counsel, I am going to give you my 
5 decision. Some of the things — I have to leave some 
6 accounting to the two of you to work out. I haven't put a 
7 pencil to all these. But with the way the Court is ruling, I 
8 don't think there will be any problem. 
9 First of all, let me indicate to you that I think 
10 the toughest question in this case is the question of the 
11 standing of the corporation, the right to sue. And I don't 
12 know what may take place. I'll say right now that the way I 
13 am looking at it, I don't think that either party has given 
14 the Court sufficient law for the Court to make — well, for 
15 the Court to be certain as to the position or what the law is 
16 as far as the situation of this type is concerned. 
17 I think each of you have stated your 
18 understanding, and quoted statutes which I don't deny as far 
19 as a corporation is concerned, a right to sue and a right to 
20 be sued. I think that the defendant is right when they argue 
21 that a corporation not in good standing doesn't have the 
22 right to sue. I'm not persuaded that going out and renewing 
23 that corporation gives that corporation a right to sue. I 
24 may be v/rong in that, but that's the position that I look at 
25 it. 
9 
1 The Court was asked here today and was listening 
2 to see what the evidence was going to be as far as any type 
3 of assignment or a winding up and dissolution of the 
4 corporation where the stockholders were given the right to 
5 collect the debts of the corporation. I heard very sparse 
6 testimony on the assignment. I was waiting for more. It 
7 didn't come in. I was waiting for some strong objection to 
8 it and it didn't come in. 
9 So this Court, the only evidence this Court can 
10 assume is there was some type of assignment given to 
11 Mr. Gardner, of which he testified, to bring the action. 
12 That if the assignment was there, I think he has the right to 
13 bring the action in his name. And of course it's filed in 
14 the name of the corporation, too, a d/b/a. I don't know that 
15 a d/b/a was proper in this situation. 
16 I also am persuaded somewhat that the whole 
17 situation was dealt with by Mr. Gardner — the defendant 
18 dealt with Mr. Gardner as him being Mr. Gardner, although he 
19 did know that the NUF Corporation did sign in that way. Of 
20 course he says the only reason it was was to keep the 
21 knowledge away from his wife. Well, if that was the reason 
22 for it, that's not a sufficient reason to hide behind the 
23 corporate veil. And in all probability the individual, 
24 Mr. Gardner, would have been responsible in the situation. 
25 So this Court is going to deny the defendant's 
1 motion to dismiss or summary judgment as far as the corporate 
2 situation is concerned. Although I readily state to you, as 
3 I already have, that it's vague in the Court's mind and there 
4 is no absolute law given to the Court to base its decision 
5 on. 
6 Now, the next situation is, these parties entered 
7 into a contract on June 15th, 1990, and the Court is going to 
8 enforce the terms of that contract. I have never seen a case 
9 that so many different, it seemed like, contracts are 
10 floating around. But I guess she's the defendant, the 
11 defendant Marilyn Madsen took the witness stand and said she 
12 drafted the contract and she drafted five copies of it. So I 
13 guess that's the reason that they are floating around. And 
14 if she made five copies, that was not good because everybody 
15 got a different copy possibly of what the final contract was. 
16 The one contract, Exhibit 2, does not have the 
17 word "summer" written into it. Exhibit 46 does have the word 
18 "summer" written into it. Exhibit 2 does not have the 
19 addition which was made later as far as the wave runners 
20 being made a part of the contract. Exhibit 4 6 does have that 
21 included in it. That leads me to believe that Exhibit 2 in 
22 all probability was the contract of which the parties were 
23 using, because they certainly pulled it out and wrote at a 
24 later date the new material on it. 
25 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, I'm sorry. I believe 
1 there is a misspeaking there. You said Exhibit 2 did have 
2 the wave runner, 4 6 did not. 
3 THE COURT: I'm sorry. 46 has the wave runner, 
4 Exhibit 2 does not. 
5 MR. CRIST: You said it right, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Well, anyway, that's the way it is. 4 6 
7 has the wave runner on it and 2 does not. 
8 The thing that convinces the Court to rule this 
9 way is that when Mr. Throckmorton took the stand, he said 
10 there were two and possibly three pens used. And he said 
11 that the "6" was crossed over and the "5" was probably 
12 crossed over with two different pens and "summer" was written 
13 in with a different pen. 
14 Well, that leads me to believe that the parties 
15 were doing some negotiating. And that on one of them it was 
16 written over at that time, the "6" was written over. And 
17 could you see? Even I could tell it had been written over 
18 again. And with that being written over, I think that the 
19 parties were adding or making changes to that part. 
20 It appears that the "summer" then was written in 
21 with the same pen and the "PG" was written on with the same 
22 pen at the time that was done. And they got it done in one 
23 contract and didn't complete it on the other contract. I 
24 don't know that, but that's the way the Court is ruling. I 
25 am ruling that "summer" was part of the contract. 
5 
1 I am also ruling that the plaintiff had the 
2 responsibility under the contract under subsection or 
3 paragraph 3 to pay $100 a month to cover the 20 percent cost 
4 of maintaining the insurance and the buoy fees. I am also 
5 ruling that the plaintiff agreed to reimburse sellers for 2 0 
6 percent of out-of-pocket expenses reasonably incurred in 
7 keeping the property and equipment in good working order or 
8 to repair any damages. That's in paragraph 4. I am also 
9 ruling in paragraph 9 that the purchaser agreed to pay $100 a 
10 week towards reserve — or $100 a year towards reserve for 
11 maintenance, and agrees to pay 20 percent of all maintenance 
12 costs which may exceed any amount that is built up in the 
13 reserve. 
14 Or in other words, I am saying that this is a 
15 valid contract and I am enforcing it. 
16 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, may I ask you a 
17 question about the reserve? 
18 THE COURT: Yes. 
19 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Is the reserve the $1200, any of 
20 the $1200 — the $100 a month that isn't spent for buoy and 
21 insurance, or is it something else? 
22 THE COURT: No. The reserve, it says, is $100 a 
23 year. 
24 MR. SUMMERHAYS: $100 a year. 
25 THE COURT: $100 a year towards the reserve for 
1 maintenance, and agrees to pay 20 percent of all maintenance 
2 costs which may exceed that reserve. And I would say, exceed 
3 the reserve in any particular year. 
4 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Yeah. 
5 THE COURT: I am also of the opinion, and I so 
6 rule, that the Rules and Regulations were attached to the 
7 contract. But even if they were not attached to the 
8 contract, it makes no difference to this Court because it 
9 does say specifically in here a number of times that he is 
10 bound by the Rules and Regulations. And if he didn't know 
11 what they were, he should have found out what they were. And 
12 it was his responsibility, speaking of the buyer, and that he 
13 is bound by the terms of the Rules and the Regulations 
14 regardless of when he got them. 
15 I am also of the opinion and so rule that the 
16 Rules and Regulations were violated by the purchaser, the 
17 buyer. But the only one that is really — the evidence is 
18 clear that the Court can find that what was violated was 
19 No. 10, and that's where no pets were allowed on it. And 
20 that that is not sufficient to forfeit the contract. And 
21 that even if others were violated, such as 8, it says, 
22 "possible termination of Agreement for noncompliance." 
23 And No. 13, it of course is the worst one — when 
24 I say the "worst" one, that could happen to the boat — and 
25 that's of course an act of negligence where they allow the 
7 
1 destruction of the boat, and not putting the buoy up 
2 properly, and the boat sinking, or burning up the engine and 
3 running it without oil. 
4 Neither of those took place. There have been no 
5 allegations of negligence whatsoever in this case. There may 
6 have been some fault, there may have been some damage. But 
7 there has been no allegation of negligence. There has been 
8 no proving. When I say "no allegation," maybe the parties 
9 have in a sense alleged negligence but they certainly haven't 
10 proven or shown negligence on any particular party as far as 
11 the damage to the boat. Therefore, the contract is not 
12 subject to forfeiture. 
13 And as I say, even though it were, as counsel well 
14 knows in all types of contracts, just the fact that it says 
15 "forfeiture," it may be too harsh and the Court does not 
16 always enforce that type of remedy anyway. Of course I don't 
17 have to face that here. 
18 I am also of the opinion that there is some 
19 negotiation between the buyer and the seller. This got 
20 involved — and this is not clear here, and I am speaking 
21 about the seventh week — maybe my notes may be more 
22 complete. But that on the contract, the seller did make a 
23 notation on the contract that because of the fact that the 
24 ski boat — and I can't read this clear — was not being 
25 provided, the additional week was given. I am of the opinion 
1 that that was for that one year and it was not a permanent 
2 situation because that's when they were negotiating as far as 
3 the particular situation is concerned. 
4 Now, this Court also has to look somewhat at the 
5 credibility of the witnesses here. And I think basically 
6 everybody who has testified in this case has been honest. I 
7 think the memories have faulted. That sometimes when you 
8 live with something so long, and even though it wasn't true 
9 originally, you convince yourself that it's the truth. 
10 And I don't know why this case was not brought 
11 before this Court a year and a half ago to be disposed of. 
12 Because that's what should have been done instead of allowing 
13 it to run on like this and the damages to continue to incur. 
14 There is no need for it. Anyway, that's where we are now. 
15 As I say, even the evidence becomes more forgetful as far as 
16 the parties are concerned. 
17 Now, I was concerned when the defendant took the 
18 witness stand. And of course he said that the purchase price 
19 was reduced from $10,000 [sic] — from $12,500 to $10,000, 
20 and that's why paragraph 2 was struck out, and that the ski 
21 boat and the wet bike were not included. And that made 
22 sense, because you have Option 1 and Option 2. Then he took 
23 the witness stand and testified later also that of course 
24 they were included in it, and changed his testimony on that 
25 when he was confronted on cross examination. 
9 
1 I was concerned when the defendant on the witness 
2 stand also testified that the wave runners had not been paid 
3 for. And counsel talked to him. And sure, I let counsel 
4 talk to his witness and refresh his memory, and that's fine. 
5 But he was quite adamant that they had not been paid for 
6 prior to the counsel talking to him on the situation. So 
7 that led me to believe somewhat that the testimony of the 
8 defendant was maybe a little more forgetful or a little more 
9 needing to make himself whole in this situation. 
10 The Court would find that the defendant was 
21 selling this because it was a hardship on him, and he didn't 
12 want to sell it. And he was going to have to sell others in 
13 order to survive on it or to be able to maintain a reasonable 
14 living. And that's fine. That's why he was doing it and 
15 that's why he was looking for additional funds to come in. 
16 And there is nothing wrong with that. And he was also 
17 looking for any person responsible to pay the expenses. 
18 Now, I am looking at Plaintiff's Exhibit 12 and 
19 Defendant's Exhibit 7. Here's where I am expecting counsel 
20 to do the accounting. I think the plaintiff is responsible 
21 for the buoy fee. Nov;, there is testimony here of three 
22 years and six years. I guess it's really been about five 
23 years and a few months. 
24 And I don't know where you are going as far as I 
25 notice that the Nauti Lady as a limited partnership is a 
1 party defendant. So I guess that this is binding on them — 
2 well, it is binding on them. I am not guessing it, it is 
3 binding on them. 
4 But when I say the "buoy fee," when I say for 
5 three years, I am talking about a responsibility between the 
6 plaintiff and the defendant Madsen in this case. 
7 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, can we run that from 
8 June 15th, 1990 to what date? Just so we can put those in 
9 there. 
10 THE COURT: It would be June 15th of '93. 
11 MR. SUMMERHAYS: So that would be three years. 
12 THE COURT: Yes. That's what I am saying. I am 
13 not saying he is not responsible — well, he is responsible 
14 for up to date. But as far as this — well, this gentleman, 
15 he still I guess is the major owner of it. I would find that 
16 the plaintiff is not bound by anything of the limited 
17 partnership or any bylaws of the limited partnership. That 
18 his dealings were with Mr. Madsen and only dealing with 
19 Mr. Madsen, and that he would be responsible for the buoy fee 
20 up to today's date. 
21 He would also be responsible for the general 
22 maintenance at $100 a year up to today's date. 
23 And he would be responsible for 20 percent of all 
24 maintenance fees which exceeds the maintenance fee, when it 
25 exceeded it. In other words, when the lower unit, the drive 
11 
1 units, had to be repaired, that was, as I recall, '91, then 
2 of course that's the time you are looking at the 20 percent 
3 coming into play. 
4 MR. SUMMERHAYS: That's above the $100 a year? 
5 THE COURT: That's right. 
6 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Yeah. 
7 THE COURT: And the Court is going to find that the 
8 damages alleged in paragraph 5 and paragraph 6 are to be 
9 shared between the plaintiff Gardner and the defendant Madsen 
10 on an 80/20 percent basis. That the evidence is not clear 
11 that any one particular party damaged the boat either 
12 negligently or otherwise, and that each party is to pay their 
13 percentage share. And that that would also include 7 as far 
14 as the property replacement. 
15 But the plaintiff is responsible for the 
16 refrigerator damage. That looking at the accounting, the 
17 Court would give the plaintiff credit as an offset for the 
18 items on the accounting on P-12 against this responsibility 
19 as the buoy fee, the general maintenance and the 20 percent 
20 maintenance. But that does not — well, it would include on 
21 the Devot or the slide winch. The parties are first to 
22 adjust that out between the two of them as to what the 
23 responsibilities to each were. And then for the overpayment 
24 by the plaintiff, you would receive credit or an offset on 
25 the maintenance. 
1 MR. SUMMERHAYS: I didn't understand that, your 
2 Honor. I'm sorry. 
3 MR. CRIST: I don't either. 
4 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Was that 80/20 on the slide or 
5 Devot or plaintiff was paying for it? 
6 THE COURT: No, no. 80/20 on the slide and Devot. 
7 Any ajnount paid over 20 percent, he would receive an offset 
8 on the others. 
9 MR. SUMMERHAYS: For maintenance. 
10 THE COURT: Of course the wave runner, naturally 
11 that's not included here nor is the purchase price. 
12 MR. SUMMERHAYS: No. When you say the wave runner 
13 is not included, your Honor, are you finding that he didn't 
14 sell the wave runner? 
15 THE COURT: Oh, yes. 
16 MR. SUMMERHAYS: He did sell the wave runner. 
17 THE COURT: Yes. My understanding on the wave 
18 runner, that that took care of itself, didn't it? 
19 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Yeah. That was a separate deal — 
20 oh, no. 
21 MR. CRIST: There were separate damages for the 
22 wave runners. 
23 MR. SUMMERHAYS: We paid $4500. He never got any 
24 wave runners. 
25 MR. KENNETH MADSEN: That's not true, your Honor. 
13 
1 MR. SUMMERHAYS: That was my client's testimony, 
2 your Honor. You need to make a finding on that. 
3 MR. CRIST: What is it you are saying? He had the 
4 use of them. He testified that he put them in storage and 
5 signed that stuff. 
6 THE COURT: My recollection of the testimony, the 
7 wave runners were purchased, he paid the $4500 on them. 
8 I am just looking at the contract here. 
9 And that he paid $4500 and that was 50 percent and 
10 he owns 50 percent of the three wave runners. And that takes 
11 care of itself. That's why he would not receive any credit 
12 off of here. Just the same as the purchase price, he would 
13 not receive any purchase price. 
14 MR. SUMMERHAYS: On that $4500? 
15 THE COURT: That's right. 
16 The Court would also find that the contract is in 
17 force and the plaintiff was entitled to six weeks each year 
18 since its inception, except for the one year and that was 
19 seven weeks, although I am eliminating that seventh week 
20 because I think that the period that the boat v/as down, it 
21 v/as into a period and part of what they say is the prime 
22 summertime, May through October. And I think that he has 
23 some responsibility on that. And so I am saying that it is 
24 six weeks, summer weeks, since the contract was entered into. 
25 I am not persuaded that the testimony was clear at 
1 $3500. In fact, I thought the testimony was very sparse as 
2 far as what the value of the week was. The best testimony 
3 that the Court has is $1800 a week. 
4 MR. SUMMERHAYS: May I ask about the week 
5 calculation, your Honor? Would that be six weeks for '90, 
6 '91, '92, '93, '94 and '95? 
7 THE COURT: Yes. 
8 MR. SUMMERHAYS: So that would be 36. 
9 THE COURT: Well, no, let's see. I am not going to 
10 give six weeks in '90, not in '90, not summertime weeks in 
11 '90 because they were entered into June 15th. That's a month 
12 and a half. I am going to say — that's the middle of the 
13 month — I am giving three weeks for '90 and six weeks for 
14 each year thereafter. 
15 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Is that less the — how many usage 
16 weeks did you find that he used? 
17 THE COURT: The testimony was that he had six weeks 
18 of use. Less the six weeks. 
19 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Okay. 
20 THE COURT: Any questions? 
21 MR. SUMMERHAYS: No. 
22 Your Honor, the attorney's fees issues. 
23 MR. CRIST: I don't understand this. Are you 
24 saying that he was denied six weeks or he got the six v/eeks? 
25 THE COURT: He used the boat six weeks since he has 
15 
1 been in the contract. And that is taken away from any 
2 damages that he is entitled to. I am saying that he is 
3 entitled to three weeks for '90, six weeks for '91, '92, '93, 
4 '94 and '95, less six weeks that he had the use of the boat. 
5 MR. CRIST: You are finding he only had use of the 
6 boat six weeks total? 
7 THE COURT: I believe that's what the testimony 
8 was. 
9 MR. CRIST: It's not even close, your Honor. It's 
10 going to be appealed anyway. 
11 THE COURT: If you can point me out where that is 
12 wrong. 
13 MR. CRIST: He testified himself that he used it 11 
14 weeks. 
15 MR. SUMMERHAYS: He said six, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: If I'm wrong on that, counsel — my 
17 notes as I read them were six weeks, and that's my memory. 
18 If I am wrong on that, then of course you'll have to look at 
19 the record. 
20 MR. SUMMERHAYS: We'll check the record, your 
21 Honor. And I think counsel and I can work that out. 
22 THE COURT: Any other questions? 
23 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Attorney's fees, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: The contract does provide for attorney 
25 fees. I have not seen the Affidavit which has been 
1 submitted. I am going to allow reasonable attorney fees. 
2 I probably will be somewhat skeptical — or 
3 "critical," I should use the term — of the attorney fees 
4 because I am of the opinion there was no reason for this case 
5 to go on the length of time that it has. Of course I will 
6 not allow any attorney fees naturally for Judge Frederick's 
7 case. 
8 MR. SUMMERHAYS: We didn't submit any. 
9 THE COURT: So I will have to look at the 
10 Affidavit, which I haven't had an opportunity to, and give 
11 you a call, counsel. Or you may call me if I don't get back 
12 to you and let you know on the attorney fees. 
13 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Your Honor, when I say I didn't 
14 submit any on Judge Frederick's, that's what I was told by my 
15 people, and I hope that is what it is. But we agree we 
16 shouldn't get any attorney fees on any part of that. 
17 THE COURT: Mr. Summerhays, I ask you to prepare 
18 the pleadings. 
19 MR. SUMMERHAYS: I will do so, your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Court will be in recess. 
21 MR. SUMMERHAYS: Thank you, your Honor. 
22 (This concludes these proceedings at 1:07 p.m.) 
23 * * * 
24 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
4 I, SUZANNE WARNICK, RMR, CSR, do certify that I am 
5 a nationally certified Registered Merit Reporter, a state 
6 Certified Shorthand Reporter, and a Notary Public in and for 
7 the State of Utah. 
That at the time and place of the proceedings in 
the foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the 
Third Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Homer 
F. Wilkinson, and thereat reported in stenotype all of the 
proceedings had therein. 
That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the 
Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the 
foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and 
correct transcript of the same. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on 
this, the 6th day of November 1995. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
My commission expires 
25 1 April 1999 
Suzann<3 Warnick, RMR, CSR 
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EXHIBIT B 
AGREEMENT 
This Agreement entered i n t o t h i s IS day of Zv>/( 1989, by and between 
KEN MADSEN and MARILYN MADSEN, husband and wi fe , of 4807 Yorktown Drive , S a l t 
L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 7 , h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s "SELLERS'1 and 
A) vlP <XvoC <\ &)n\ S f r f t f < i -to*! , a •-•fe«gfer of J W J ~ 
Vo^ ki-fi # Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as "BUYERS"; 
In c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e i r mutual p romises , the p a r t i e s agree as fo l lows: 
OPTICN NO- 1: 
1. SELLERS agree to s e l l and BUYERS agree t o purchase a ten percen t 
(10%) i n t e r e s t in the fo l lowing desc r ibed p roper ty : 
62 f o o t Summerset C r u i s e r h o u s e b o a t i n c l u d i n g the a c c e s s o r i e s 
thereon , a J e t Ski Boat and a Wet Bike. 
i R S a g r e e to pay t o SELLERS the to£aL-^*rchabcf p i lLc u£ T/ZEcVE 
THOUSAND DOLLAR^^F^VETHUNDRED " DOLLARS ($i2,oUo7~?^l—the-
^ l b e d p rope r ty . 
' '-"?«**<: 
C OPTICN NO, 2 : 
Same as above excluding Ski Boat and Wet Bike, BUYERS agree to pay 
.^ a**" to SELLERS for r.en percent (10%) interest in the 62 foot Sumnrer 
• J -V. 
>;-** Cruiser houseboat TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000). 
BUYERS agree to pay an additional ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($100.00) per 
month to cover twenty
 r 'B {$%) percent of tne cosus to maintain 
insurance and buov fees and other miscellaneous costs incurred to 
I 
maintain the property. (insurance and storage fees for ski boat ar.d 
wet bike have not yet been determined). 
OTT™s tor twenty-**- # » > * 
„
 = a r e = to reimburse SELLERS tor BWERS further agree ^
 r e a s o n a W y incurred to keep 
^ c e n t of any out-of-fccket expense ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
t n e property and . * * » « * thereon in ^ ^ ^ 
r e p a i r a n y „ or e ^ n t failures « * 
p R R W . ( R e £ e r to Boat Rules and M - ^ ^ ^ Qf tte 
BOffiRS will - - t i t l e d to the exclusive | ^ ^ ^ ^ 
a b o v e descr ied property for a total % £ ^ y ^ ^ ^ u s e o f 
( r e f e t to Boat » U - - > * - « " " ^ r i g h t o f ^ i v e 
• , SELLER would then have the riy 
unscheduled time) • SELLER ^ ^ ^
 o f ^ 
u s e and possession of the property ^ ^ 
Time Schedule for 1990 will be neg 
c a l e n d a r year. Time . ^ Future 
BUVEBS and SELLERS at the u « of signl g ^ ^ ^ 
T i m 2 Schedules will t e s e , . , at the « u - , 
Year. .. . . ^ v are the owners 
s a l £ B S really « ~ and ^ e e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
o £ t he above d e s e r t property an h* ^ ^ ^ ^ 
property. ^ t
 s a i d property 
^ i f i c a l l y acknowledge and agree tn 
,
 T h e parties s p e c i a l l y ^ ^ ^ ^ tte 
d e 5 C t i t ^ above is being sold ^ ^ ^ 
-
 f l t l e SELLERS raske no further warr 
warranties c- t i t l e , spec i f ica l ly 
„ f -aid described property, c o n d i t i o n of said ^ ^ ^ ^
 s a m s 
acknowledge that they have « ~ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
i n i t s present condition and upon thei 
a nd without reliance upon representations of th 
- 3 -
8. SELLERS agree to continue to maintain collision and liability 
insurance on said property. 
9. In addition to the purchase price and the aforementioned expenses, 
each BUYER agrees to pay $1001 per year towards a reserve for 
maintenance and agrees to pay ^ SSror all maintenance costs which may 
exceed the reserve. 
10. BUYER agrees to be bound by the attached Rules & Regulations, the 
attached usage schedule and specifically for forfeiture provisions 
contained in the Rules & Regulations which provide the circumstances 
under which a BUYER will forfeit his entire interest in the cruiser. 
11. The parties agree that should BUYER desire to sell his interest in 
the Cruiser, the decision as to the sale can only be made upon 
agreement between SELLER and JEUYER. Should SELLER and BUYER 
determine to sell the cruiser, it will be sold and the proceeds 
therefrom, after paying all sales expenses and etc. shall be divided 
according to the percent owned. 
12. The SELLER and BUYER agrees that any decision as to trading the 
Cruiser in on a successor cruiser will only be made by unanimous 
decision of SELLER and BUYER. 
13. The Cruiser (Nauti Lady) will remain harbored at Hite Marina, Lake 
Powell, UT. 
14. It is the intent of the SELLER to retain controlling interest of 55% 
of the Cruiser. 
15. 
,
 does ^ " P * * - « "
r0
"
t ,10%1
 °
f S3id 
T h e undersigned dees hereby pure™ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
cruiser and other described property. » ^ ^ 
^ this * r — * • the a * - * * « « * * 
attorneysfees and costs o, the prevail partV 
™,-his Af day o£A^_lS9°-DATED this _££— p-^ / //I Y j 
•DTT^DSST "Seller" 
MARILYN K. MADSEN 
"Buyer 
(j ^" 
3T A« yv/v 
/NJ \ 
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